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ABSTRACT
This paper is aimed at providing a comprehensive overview of, and responses to, four very vital 
components of the consultative processes which have contributed to the new framework known as 
Basel III.  The paper will approach these components in the order of the consultative processes, 
namely, the capital proposals, the liquidity proposals and the Proposal to ensure the loss absorbency 
of regulatory capital at the point of non-viability. The capital proposals comprise proposals aimed at 
strengthening the resilience of the banking sector, the proposal relating to international framework 
for liquidity risk measurement,  standards and monitoring and,  the countercyclical  capital  buffer 
proposal.
Whilst  the capital  proposals  have been welcomed, there  has been growing realisation since the 
aftermath  of  the  recent  Financial  Crises  that  banks  which  have  been  complying  with  capital 
adequacy requirements could still face severe liquidity problems.
As well as highlighting the importance of introducing counter cyclical capital buffers, the response 
to  the  countercyclical  proposal  draws  attention  to  the  need  for  greater  focus  on more  forward 
looking provisions,  as  well  as provisions  which are  aimed at  addressing losses and unforeseen 
problems attributed to “maturity transformation of short-term deposits into long term loans.” 
The Basel Committee’s consultative document on the “Proposal to Ensure the Loss Absorbency of 
Regulatory Capital at the Point of Non Viability” sets out a proposal aimed at “enhancing the entry 
criteria of regulatory capital to ensure that all regulatory capital instruments issued by banks are 
capable of absorbing losses in the event that a bank is unable to support itself in the private market.”
Amongst  other  issues  addressed,  the  response to  the consultative document  highlights  why the 
controlled winding down procedure also constitutes a means whereby losses could still be absorbed 
in the event that a bank is unable to support itself in the private market.
Key Words: Counter cyclical buffers, liquidity risks, pro cyclicality, loan loss provisions, financial 
crises, bank, regulation, capital, insolvency; financial crises, moral hazard, Basel III.
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Response to Consultative Document on Strengthening the Resilience of the 
Banking Sector: Proposals to Strengthen Global Capital and Liquidity 
Regulations
A. Introduction
The 1988 Basel Accord was adopted as a means of achieving two primary objectives namely:2
 - „To help strengthen the soundness and stability of the international banking system. This would 
be facilitated where international banking organisations were encouraged to supplement their 
capital positions.
 - To mitigate competitive inequalities“
The  framework  was  not  only  oriented  towards  increasing  the  sensitivity  of  regulatory  capital 
differences  in  risk  profiles  which  exist  within  banking  organisations,  but  was  also  aimed  at 
discouraging the retention of liquid,  low risk assets.3 Furthermore,  it  was designed to take into 
express  consideration,  off  balance  sheet  exposures  when  assessments  of  capital  adequacy  are 
undertaken.4
Ten years following the conclusion of the agreement on the 1988 Accord, a Working Party was 
established to evaluate  the impact  and achievements of the Basel Accord.  Two principal  issues 
which were taken into consideration by the Working Party were:5 Firstly, whether some banks have 
been encouraged to hold higher capital ratios than would have been the case if the adoption of fixed 
minimum capital requirements had not occurred and, whether an increase in capital or reduction of 
lending has resulted in any increase in ratios. Secondly, an evaluation of the impact of fixed capital 
requirements on reduced risk taking by banks, in relation to capital, was also to be undertaken.
In  response  to  the  first  issue,  relating  to  whether  an  introduction  of  fixed  minimum  capital 
requirements  has  led  to  banks  maintaining  higher  capital  ratios,  some  studies  which  were 
undertaken, revealed that capital standards, when strictly adhered to, compelled weakly capitalised 
banks to consolidate their capital ratios.6 In response to whether banks adjusted their capital ratios 
to comply with requirements through an increase in capital or a reduction of risk-weighted assets, 
research revealed that banks responded to pressures stemming from capital ratios, in a way which 
they perceived to  be most  cost  effective.7 Results  obtained in  response to  an evaluation of  the 
impact of capital requirements on risk taking were inconclusive.8 The data available for purposes of 
measuring bank risk taking, were not only limited, but also complicated the task of making an 
2„Capital Requirements and Bank Behaviour: The Impact of the Basle Accord“ Basle Committee on Banking 
Supervision Working Papers No 1 April 1999 at page 1 < http://www.bis.org/publ/bcbs_wp1.pdf?noframes=1> 
3ibid
4ibid
5ibid
6Ibid at page 2
7Ibid at page 3
8ibid
evaluation thereof.9
Other issues which were difficult to evaluate included whether an introduction of minimum capital 
requirements for banks were detrimental to their competitiveness and whether the Basel Accord 
facilitated competitive inequalities amongst banks.10 These evaluative difficulties, respectively, were 
attributed firstly, to the fact that “long term competitiveness of banking” depends on a variety of 
factors – most of which are not connected to regulation and secondly, to the available evidence at 
the time – which was inconclusive – and hence, not sufficiently persuasive.11
I. Amendments to the 1988 Accord
The First Consultative Paper – The Three Pillar Model
In June 1999, as a means of replacing the 1988 Basel Accord, the first consultative paper (on a new 
capital adequacy framework) was issued by the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision. The First 
Consultative Paper introduced the “three pillar” model which comprises of “the minimum capital 
requirements” – that attempt to consolidate the rules established in the 1988 Accord, “supervisory 
review” and “market discipline” – “as a lever to strengthen disclosure and encourage safe and sound 
banking practices”.12 Whilst acknowledging that the 1988 Accord had “helped to strengthen the 
soundness  and stability of  the  international  banking  system and enhanced competitive  equality 
among internationally active banks”, it was added that the new framework provided by the first 
consultative paper was “designed to better align regulatory capital requirements to underlying risks 
and to recognise the improvements to risk measurement13 and control.“
One of the flaws inherent in the 1988 Basel Accord was namely, the fact that it rewarded risky 
lending since it  required banks to set  aside the same amount  of capital  against  loans  to shaky 
borrowers as against those with better credits.14 Apart from the fact that capital requirements were 
just  reasonably  related  to  bank’s  risk  taking,  the  credit  exposure  requirement  was  the  same 
regardless of the credit  rating of the borrower.15 Furthermore,  the capital  requirement for credit 
exposure often depended on the exposure’s legal form – for instance, an on-balance sheet loan was 
generally subject to a higher capital requirement than an off-balance sheet to the same borrower.16 
In addition to  such insensitivity to  risk,  another  problem which resulted from Basel  2 was  the 
unwillingness of banks to invest in better risk management systems.
II. Capital Arbitrage
A general criticism of Basel I relates to the fact that it promoted capital arbitrage. This is attributed 
to  its  wide  risk  categories  which  provide  banks  with  the  liberty  to  “arbitrage  between  their 
9ibid
10Ibid at page 4
11Ibid at pages 4 and 5
12See ‚Consultative Paper on a New Capital Adequacy Framework“ June 1999 < 
http://www.bis.org/press/p990603.htm> 
13See remarks of the chairman of the Task Force on the Future of Capital regulation; ibid  
14„Basle bust“ The Economist April 13th 2000  
15M Saidenberg and T Schuermann,‚The New Basel Capital Accord and Questions for Research (2003) Wharton 
Financial Institutions Center Working Paper 2003 at page 4  
16ibid
economic  assessment  of  risk  and  the  regulatory  capital  requirements.”17 “Regulatory  capital 
arbitrage” involves the practice by banks of “using securitisation to alter the profile of their book 
and may produce the effect of making the bank’s capital ratios appear inflated.18  Such a practice 
justifies the extension of regulation to the securities markets – rather than being merely confined to 
the field of banking.
Four  principal  types  of  identified  capital  arbitrage  include:19cherry  picking,  securitisation  with 
partial recourse, remote origination and indirect credit. 
III. Basel II 
Some of the key factors which instigated the introduction of Basel 2 include:20 
− „Changes in the structure of capital markets – resulting in the need for the incorporation of 
increased competitiveness of credit markets in capital requirements
− The need for measures which would facilitate the eradication of inefficiencies in lending 
markets 
− Explosive debt levels which were generated during the economic upturn.“
Under Basel II, and in response to the fact that the measurement of minimum capital was previously 
based on a general assessment of risk dispersion which did not correspond to specific circumstances 
of individual institutions, credit institutions will be required to retain more capital if required. Under 
Pillar 1, the definition of capital and minimum capital coefficient remain unchanged – however, 
credit  institutions  will  be  required  to  retain  more  capital  if  their  individual  risk  situation  so 
demands.21 Further advancements under Basel II are illustrated in the areas of risk measurements. 
The measurement methods for credit risk are more sophisticated than was previously the case. For 
the first time, a means of measuring operational risk has been set out.22 Under Pillar One, credit and 
market risk are supplemented by operational risk – which is to be corroborated by capital.23 
B. Basel  Committee's  Proposals  to  Strengthen  Global  Capital  and  Liquidity  
Regulations
I. Objectives of the Basel Committee's Proposals to Strengthen Global Capital and Liquidity 
Regulations24
- “As well as strengthening global capital and liquidity regulations (which would ultimately 
17‘Capital Requirements and Bank Behaviour: The Impact of the Basel Accord’ Basel Committee on Banking 
Supervision Working Papers April 1999 at page 21  
18ibid; Bank’s capital ratio may appear inflated “relative to the riskiness of the remaining exposure”, see ibid 
19See ibid at pages 22-24  
20See A Saunders and L Allen, Credit Risk Measurement: New Approaches to Value at Risk and Other Paradigms (2002) 
Second Edition Wiley Publishers at page 24  
21See ‘Basel II: Minimum Capital Requirements’ 
http://www.bundesbank.de/bankenaufsicht/bankenaufsicht_basel_saeule1.en.php 
22ibid
23ibid
24See Basel Committee on Banking Supervision, 'Strengthening the Resilience of the Banking Sector' Consultative 
Document, Bank for International Settlements Publications December 2009 at page 1
facilitate a more resilient banking sector), the Basel Committee’s reforms are aimed towards 
improving the banking sector’s ability to absorb shocks arising from financial and economic 
stress – hence mitigating spill over risks from the financial sector to the real economy.
- The  Committee  is  also  striving  towards  the  improvement  of  risk  management  and 
governance as well as strengthen banks’ transparency and disclosures. “
II. Key elements of the Basel Committee’s proposals
1) The quality, consistency, and transparency of capital base will be raised to ensure that large, 
internationally active banks are in a better position to absorb losses on both a going concern 
and gone concern basis. (For example, under the current Basel Committee standard, banks 
could hold as little as 2% common equity to risk-based assets, before the application of key 
regulatory adjustments).
 -  As well  as recommending an increase in the quality,  consistency and transparency of capital 
base25, the Basel Committee’s recognition of the fact that “insufficient detail on the components of 
capital”26 render “accurate assessment of its  quality or a meaning comparison with other banks 
difficult”,  infers  its  acknowledgement  of  the  importance  attributed  to  enhanced  disclosures. 
Furthermore,  the  increased importance  attached to  the  role  of  central  counter  parties  in  efforts 
aimed at reducing systemic risks should also facilitate the process of achieving greater and more 
enhanced disclosures.
2) The risk coverage of the capital framework will be strengthened. In addition to the trading 
book  and  securitisation  reforms  announced  in  July  2009,  the  Committee  proposes  the 
consolidation of the capital requirements for counterparty credit risk exposures arising from 
derivatives  and  securities  financing  activities.  These  enhancements  are  aimed  at 
strengthening  the  resilience  of  individual  banking  institutions  and  reducing  the  risk  of 
shocks  being  transmitted  from  one  institution  to  another  through  the  derivatives  and 
financing  channel.  Consolidated  counterparty  capital  requirements  should  increase 
incentives to transfer OTC derivative exposures to central counterparties and exchanges. 
However there is also a limit to what the capital framework could address. As highlighted by the 
recent  crisis,  capital  requirements  on  their  own,  were  insufficient  in  addressing  liquidity  and 
funding problems which arose during the crisis. The importance of enhanced disclosures is also 
reflected  and embodied  within  the  Committee's  second objective  in  relation  to  its  proposal  to 
strengthen the resilience of the banking sector, that is, its endeavours “to improve risk management 
and governance as well as strengthen banks’ transparency and disclosures.”
As a result of the inability of bank capital adequacy requirements, on their own, to address funding 
and liquidity problems27, the need to focus on Pillar 3 of Basel II, namely, market  discipline, is 
becoming more apparent. There is growing justification for greater measures aimed at extending 
capital  rules to  the securities markets.  This not  only arises from increased conglomeration and 
globalisation – which increases risks attributed to systemic contagion, but also the fact that „the 
globalisation of financial markets has made it possible for investors and capital seeking companies 
to switch to lightly regulated or completely unregulated markets.“28 Furthermore, it  is not only 
25 See first key element of the proposals being issued by the Basel Committee.
26 See Consultative Document of the Basel Committee for Banking Supervision, “Strengthening the Resilience of the 
Banking Sector” December 2009 at page 13 
27 See M Ojo, 'Extending the Scope of Prudential Supervision: Regulatory Developments During and Beyond the 
'Effective' Periods of the Post BCCI and the Capital Requirements Directives' , Journal of Advanced Research in Law 
and Economics July 2010. 
28 See Deutsche Bundesbank , „Securities Market Regulation: International Approaches“ Deutsche Bundesbank Monthly 
Report January 2006 at page 41
argued that „the fact that many banks in a number of countries have chosen to securitise assets is 
probably largely due to the capital requirements imposed on them“, but also that present rules do 
not „explicitly cover risks other than credit and market risk“.29
The engagement of market participants in the corporate reporting process, a process which would 
consequently  enhance  market  discipline,  constitutes  a  fundamental  means  whereby  greater 
measures aimed at facilitating prudential supervision, could be extended to the securities markets. 
Through  Pillar  3,  market  participants  like  credit  agencies  can  determine  the  levels  of  capital 
retained by banks – hence their potential to rectify or exacerbate pro cyclical effects resulting from 
Pillars 1 and 2. The challenges encountered by Pillars 1 and 2 in addressing credit risk is reflected 
by problems  identified  with  pro  cyclicality,  which  are  attributed  to  banks’ extremely sensitive 
internal credit risk models, and the level of capital buffers which should be retained under Pillar 
Two. Such issues justify the need to give greater prominence to Pillar 3.
As a result of the influence and potential of market participants in determining capital levels, such 
market  participants  are  able  to  assist  regulators  in  managing  more  effectively,  the  impact  of 
systemic risks which occur when lending criteria is tightened owing to Basel II's procyclical effects. 
Regulators are able to respond and to manage with greater efficiency, systemic risks to the financial 
system during periods when firms which are highly leveraged become reluctant to lend. This being 
particularly the case when such firms decide to cut back on lending activities, and the decisions of 
such firms cannot  be justified in  situations  where such firms’ credit  risk models are  extremely 
sensitive  –  hence  the  level  of  capital  being  retained  is  actually  much  higher  than  minimum 
regulatory Basel capital requirements.30
The European Central Bank’s report on “Credit Default Swaps and Counter Party Risk” identifies 
asymmetrical information as constituting a challenge for non-dealer market participants since in its 
view, price information is currently limited, as dealer prices are typically set on a bilateral basis and 
are not available to non-dealers.31 Furthermore, the Report also identifies the role played by credit 
default swaps in the recent financial crises, highlights the contribution of counter risk management 
in  the  collapse  of  Bear  Stearns  and  Lehman  Brothers,  and  also  the  challenges  relating  to  the 
management of counter party risk exposures which arise from Credit Default Swaps (CDSs) and 
other (“over the counter”)OTC derivatives.32
Furthermore, the ECB recently highlighted that “no disclosure requirements currently exist within 
the IASB accounting standards with respect to the main counterparts for derivative transactions.” It 
also states that “added disclosures for large counter parties and those that exceed certain thresholds 
would be useful in order to enable market participants to better assess their counterparty33 risk and 
the potential for systemic spill over effects.”
3) The Basel Committee will  introduce a leverage ratio as a supplementary measure to the 
Basel II risk based framework with a view to changing to a Pillar 1 treatment based on 
appropriate review and calibration. This should help to contain the build up of excessive 
leverage in the banking system, introduce additional safeguards against attempts to “game” 
29Regulation, it is further argued, „may also impact on the relationship between banks and the securities market as a source of 
finance. So long as the banks are required to set aside 8% capital for loans to the financially soundest companies, direct 
borrowing in securities markets will probably be a cheaper form of funding for these companies“. See „Basel Committee’s 
Proposal for a New Capital Adequacy  Framework“http://www.norges-bank.no/templates/article____15120.aspx  For 
further information on this see M Ojo, „The Impact of Capital and Disclosure Requirements on Risks and Risk Taking 
Incentives“ (2010)
30For further information on this, see M Ojo, ' Basel II and the Capital Requirements Directive: Responding to the 
2008/09 Financial Crisis' (2009) http://ssrn.com/abstract=1475189
31 „Credit Default Swaps and Counter Party Risk“ European Central Bank 2009 at page 62
32  ibid at page 36
33Private sector financial institutions
the risk based requirements, and help address model risk. In order to ensure comparability, 
the  details  of  the  leverage  ratio  are  to  be  harmonised  internationally.  –  making  full 
adjustments for residual accounting differences. 
4) The Committee will  introduce a  series of measures aimed at  promoting the build  up of 
capital buffers during good times – which could be drawn upon during periods of stress. A 
counter cyclical capital framework will contribute to a more stable banking system which 
will  help  dampen,  instead  of  amplify,  economic  and  financial  shocks.  In  addition  the 
Committee  will  be  promoting  a  more  forward  looking  provisioning  which  is  based  on 
expected losses, and which captures actual losses with greater transparency and which is 
also less pro cyclical than the present model (the “incurred loss” provisioning model).
As was highlighted under  the introductory section,  the promotion of financial  stability through 
more risk sensitive capital requirements, constitutes one of Basel II’s primary objectives.34 However 
some problems identified with Basel II are attributed to pro cyclicality and to the fact that not all 
material  credit  risks  in  the  trading  book  are  adequately  accounted  for  in  the  current  capital 
requirements.35 The pro cyclical nature of Basel II has been criticised since “capital requirements 
for credit risk as a probability of default of an exposure decreases in the economic upswing and 
increases during the downturn”36 – hence resulting in capital requirements which fluctuate over the 
cycle.  Other  identified37 consequential  effects  include  the  fact  that  fluctuations  in  such  capital 
requirements may result in credit institutions raising their capital during periods when its is costly 
for them to implement such a rise – which has the potential of inducing banks to cut back on their 
lending. It is concluded that “risk sensitive capital requirements should have pro cyclical effects 
principally on undercapitalised banks.”38
According to the Financial Stability Forum (FSF), an earlier recognition of loan losses, which could 
have been facilitated by relevant disclosures about loan loss provisioning, could have reduced pro 
cyclical  effects  which  occurred  during  the  recent  crisis.39 Not  only does  the  FSF propose  that 
amendments be made to the Basel II framework - amendments which are aimed at reducing banks’ 
disincentives  to  increase their  level  of  provisions for  loan losses,  it  is  also of  the opinion that 
measures  aimed  at  improving  market  discipline  could  also  help  in  reducing  procyclicality  and 
diversity.40 Furthermore,  incentives  which  would  encourage  banks  to  retain  liquidity  could  be 
introduced – however , such incentives should be granted whilst striving to comply with the aims 
and objectives of Basel – particularly those aimed at enhancing a regulatory framework which is 
more aligned with economic and regulatory capital.  As acknowledged by the Basel Committee, 
„certain incentives which assume the form of capital reductions are considered to impose minimum 
operational  standards in recognition that poor management of operational risks (including legal 
risks) could render such risk mitigants of effectively little or no value and that although partial 
mitigation  is  rewarded,  banks  will  be  required  to  hold  capital  against  residual  risks”.  Hence 
incentives  should  also  adequately  account  for  situations  where  poor  management  systems  may 
34For further objectives, see , Accompanying Document to the Proposal for a Directive of the European Parliament and of the 
Council amending Capital Requirements Directive on trading book, securitisation issues and remuneration policies. < 
http://ec.europa.eu/internal_market/bank/docs/regcapital/com2009/impact_assesment_en.pdf > at page 22 of 47
35See ibid at page 23 of 47
36See Annex on Proc cyclicality, Accompanying Document to the Proposal for a Directive of the European Parliament and of 
the Council amending Capital Requirements Directive on trading book, securitisation issues and remuneration policies. 
<http://ec.europa.eu/internal_market/bank/docs/regcapital/com2009/impact_assesment_en.pdf> at page 46 of 47
37As identified in the Accompanying Document to the Proposal for a Directive of the European Parliament and of the Council 
amending Capital Requirements Directive on trading book, securitisation issues and remuneration policies. See page 46 of 47
38See “Is Basel II Pro Cyclical? A Selected Review of the Literature” Financial Stability Review December 2009 at page 150
39Report of the Financial Stability Forum on “Addressing Pro cyclicality in the Financial System: Measuring and Funding 
Liquidity Risk” at pages 20 and 22
40ibid at pages 21 and 22
operate in institutions which are supposed to have risk mitigants.
As well as drawing attention to the fact that capital buffers may not actually mitigate the cyclical 
effects of bank regulation,41 regulators are also advised to give due consideration to the effects of 
risk weights on bank portfolio behaviour when implementing regulations.
5) As its fifth proposal, a global minimum liquidity standard for internationally active banks is 
to  be introduced by the Committee.  This  will  include a  30 day liquidity coverage ratio 
requirement which is underpinned by a longer term structural liquidity ratio. The framework 
will  also  incorporate  a  common set  of  monitoring  metrics  to  assist  supervisors  in  their 
analysis and identification of risk trends . both at the bank and system wide level. Such 
standards and monitoring metrics will serve to supplement the Basel Committee’s Principles 
for Sound Liquidity Risk Management and Supervision.
III. Other points highlighted by the Committee
- The review of the need for additional capital, liquidity or other supervisory measures aimed 
at reducing externalities generated by systemically important institutions.
- Recognition that severity of the economic and financial crisis is attributed to the fact that 
excessive on- and off-balance sheet leverage had been accumulated by banking sectors  of 
many  countries  whilst  many  banks  were  retaining  insufficient  liquidity  buffers. 
Consequences resulting from this include the inability of the banking system to absorb the 
resulting systemic trading and credit  losses .  Further,  the banking system was unable to 
manage the “re intermediation” of large off balance exposures which had accumulated.
- Aggravation  of  the  crisis  owing  to  pro  cyclical  effects  and  the  interconnectedness  of 
systemic  institutions  –  such  interconnectedness  being  triggered  by  a  range  of  complex 
transactions.
Systemic risks and the central role assumed by banks in relation to liquidity serves as greater
justification for regulation with respect to banks. “The fundamental role of banks in the maturity 
transformation of short-term deposits into long-term loans makes banks inherently vulnerable to 
liquidity risk, both of an institution-specific nature and that which affects markets as a whole.“42
In relation to the securities markets, information asymmetry appears to constitute a greater basis for 
regulation. However, the existence of information asymmetry within the banking43sector has the 
potential to generate systemic effects within the banking sector – consequences whose effects, it 
could be said,  could have greater  repercussions  than if  such were to  originate  from within the 
securities markets.
41See P Agénor and L Pereira da Silva , „Cyclical Effects of Bank Capital Requirements with Imperfect Credit Markets“ 
World Bank Policy Research Paper 5067 at page 36.They illustrate through their model that capital buffers, by lowering 
deposit rates, are actually expansionary and that hence, “if capital buffers are increased during an expansion, with the initial 
objective of being countercyclical, they may actually turn out to be procyclical.” This, in their opinion, is an important 
conclusion, given the prevailing view that “countercyclical regulatory requirements may be a way to reduce the build up of 
systemic risks:if the signaling effects of capital buffers are important, “leaning against the wind” may not reduce the 
amplitude of the financial-business cycle.” For more information on this, also see M Ojo, „The Impact of Capital and 
Disclosure Requirements on Risks and Risk Taking Incentives“ (2010)
42Report of the Financial Stability Forum on “Addressing Pro cyclicality in the Financial System: Measuring and Funding 
Liquidity Risk” http://www.financialstabilityboard.org/publications/r_0904a.pdf at page 24
43 According to the Bundesbank, „the economics of information, which is widely applicable to the financial markets, therefore 
eases the rigorous assumptions about information requirements and market perfection.“ See Deutsche Bundesbank , 
„Securities Market Regulation: International Approaches“ Deutsche Bundesbank Monthly Report January 2006 at page 36
The link between liquidity and systemic risks as illustrated in the ECB’s Financial Stability Review, 
is attributed to the “destruction of specific knowledge44 which banks have about their borrowers and 
the reduction of the common pool of liquidity.”45 The importance of the link between liquidity risks 
and systemic risks within the banking sector is highlighted by the consequences attributed to the 
reluctance of banks to retain liquidity - given the cost  of holding liquidity.46 The consequential 
shortfalls of liquidity as reflected by on and off balance sheet maturity mismatches accentuates the 
importance of the role assumed by central banks in the funding of bank balance sheets.47
1. Mitigating the Procyclical Effects of Basel II
According to a report,48 the two principal solutions which have been endorsed by the Turner Review 
and the DeLarosiere Report, and which are considered to have the potential to reduce pro cyclical 
effects49 induced by the CRD and Basel II, include: 1) The requirement that banks “hold bigger 
reserves during good times - hence limiting credit and risk expansion in good times and storing up 
capital to be used during bad times” (2) “Increasing risk-weighting on a range of assets because this 
also restricts balance sheet expansion”. 
Another proposal put forward as an optimal means of rectifying Basel II's procyclical effects – as 
illustrated through the “amplification of business cycle fluctuations”, involves the utilisation of a 
“business cycle multiplier of the Basel II capital requirements that is increasing in the rate of growth 
of  the  GDP”.  Under  such  a  scheme,  it  is  argued,  riskier  “banks  would  face  higher  capital 
requirements without regulation exacerbating credit bubbles and crunches.”50
Other mechanisms provided under the CRD as means of mitigating pro cyclicality within the capital 
requirements framework include:51
− The use of downturn Loss Given Default (LGD) estimates, PD estimates being based on 
long  data  series,  technical  adjustments  made  to  the  risk  weight  function,  stress  testing 
requirements and Pillar  2 supervisory review process. It  is  acknowledged, however,  that 
more  measures  may  be  required  to  mitigate  the  procyclical  effects  of  the  capital 
requirements framework. Options provided include those aimed at reducing its cyclical risk 
44Since specific knowledge which banks possess about their borrowers is considered to be a factor which determines the 
illiquidity of bank loans; see “The Concept of Systemic Risk” ECB Financial Stability Review December 2009 at page 
137<http://www.ecb.int/pub/fsr/shared/pdf/ivbfinancialstabilityreview200912en.pdf?05d3164914c6a14bb13522 
2b5c3894fa>
45ibid; According to the Review, the reduction in the common pool of liquidity also has the potential to trigger the failure of 
banks and could consequently lead to a devaluation of illiquid bank assets and further aggravation of problems within the 
banking sector.
46Report of the Financial Stability Forum on “Addressing Pro cyclicality in the Financial System: Measuring and Funding 
Liquidity Risk” http://www.financialstabilityboard.org/publications/r_0904a.pdf at page 24
47ibid
48The Turner Review :Key Elements of the Turner Review (page 2 of 4) <http://www.dlapiper.com>
49Exacerbated strains on bank capital is the term used to denote procyclicality ; see ibid International Accounting 
Standards are also considered to have had a pro-cyclical impact. It is stated that “in particular moving to marking to 
market accounting, rather than the more traditional marking to maturity, exacerbated volatility in the accounts of banks 
– with valuation becoming practically impossible for some securities as the market in them disappeared.”;  ibid
50R Repullo, J Saurina, and Carlos Trucharte, “How to Mitigate the Procyclical Effects of Capital Adequacy Rules” 
<http://www.eurointelligence.com/article.581+M5ff0e4ba595.0.html>
51See the Accompanying Document to the Proposal for a Directive of the European Parliament and of the Council 
amending Capital Requirements Directive on trading book, securitisation issues and remuneration policies 
http://ec.europa.eu/internal_market/bank/docs/regcapital/com2009/impact_assesment_en.pdf Page 46 of 47
sensitivity,  measures  which  enhance  its  risk capture,  and  the  intentional  introduction  of 
counter-cyclical buffers (comprising capital and/or provisions). 
2. Financial Stability Forum Recommendations Aimed at Mitigating Procyclicality 
In its report52 on “Addressing Procyclicality in the Financial System”, the Financial Stability 
Forum’s recommendations to mitigate mechanisms that amplify procyclicality was extended to 
three areas:53
i) bank capital framework, ii) bank loan loss provisions as well as iii) leverage and valuation
issues. 
A summary of the recommendations relating to capital, as provided in the Report of the Financial 
Stability Forum is as follows:54
• “That the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision (BCBS) should strengthen the 
regulatory capital framework so that the quality and level of capital in the banking system 
increase during strong economic conditions and can be drawn down during periods of 
economic and financial stress;
• That the BCBS should revise the market risk framework of Basel II to reduce the reliance on 
cyclical VAR-based capital estimates;
• The BCBS should supplement the risk-based capital requirement with a simple, non-risk 
based measure to help contain the build-up of leverage in the banking system and put a floor 
under the Basel II framework;
• Supervisors should use the Basel Committee's enhanced stress testing practices as a critical 
part of the Pillar 2 supervisory review process to validate the adequacy of banks’ capital 
buffers above the minimum regulatory capital requirement;”
“That the BCBS should monitor the impact of the Basel II framework and make appropriate 
adjustments to dampen excessive cyclicality of the minimum capital requirements;”
“That the BCBS carry out regular assessments of the risk coverage of the capital framework 
in relation to financial developments and banks’ evolving risk profiles and make timely 
enhancements.”
3. Risk Management and Governance
“Stress  testing  is  an  important  risk  management  tool  –  particularly  for  counter  party  risk 
management.”55 
52 “Report of the Financial Stability Forum on Addressing Pro cyclicality in the Financial System” 
http://www.financialstabilityboard.org/publications/r_0904a.pdf
53Accompanying Document to the Proposal for a Directive of the European Parliament and of the Council amending 
Capital Requirements Directive on trading book, securitisation issues and remuneration policies 
http://ec.europa.eu/internal_market/bank/docs/regcapital/com2009/impact_assesment_en.pdf page 46 of 47
54 See “Report of the Financial Stability Forum on Addressing Pro cyclicality in the Financial System” at pages 2 and 3 
http://www.financialstabilityboard.org/publications/r_0904a.pdf
55 See Bank for International Settlements, Consultative Document „Strengthening the Resilience of the Banking Sector“ 
at page 48
According  to  the  Basel  Committee,56 “  as  public  disclosure  increases  certainty  in  the  market, 
improves transparency, facilitates valuation, and strengthens market discipline, it is important that 
banks publicly disclose information on a regular basis that  enables market participants to make 
informed decisions about the soundness of their liquidity risk management framework and liquidity 
position.” The involvement of market participants in the process whereby the Committee strives to 
facilitate market discipline through the development of “a set of disclosure requirements which will 
allow such market participants to assess key pieces of information on the scope of application, 
capital, risk exposures, risk assessment processes, and hence capital adequacy of an institution“57 
constitutes a vital means whereby effective corporate governance could be facilitated.
Recent  reports  have  revealed  the  lack  of  knowledge  demonstrated  by  financial  institutions  in 
relation to risks involved when engaged with “businesses and structured credit products.”58 The fact 
that banks “did not adhere to the fundamental tenets of sound financial judgement and prudent risk 
management” was also highlighted.59
Greater efforts have been undertaken to involve market participants by encouraging them to assess a 
bank’s risk profile. Such proactive efforts are more desirable than “allowing markets to evolve and 
decide.”60 As identified by the Basel Committee, “improvements in risk management must evolve to 
keep pace with rapid financial innovation.61 Furthermore, it states that “ this is particularly relevant 
for  participants  in  evolving  and  rapidly  growing  businesses.62 Innovation  has  increased  the 
complexity and potential illiquidity of structured credit products – which in turn, could make such 
products not only more difficult to value and hedge, but also lead to inadvertent increases in overall 
risk.”63 “Further,  the increased growth of complex investor specific products may result  in thin 
markets  that  are illiquid – which could expose a bank to  large losses in times of stress,  if  the 
associated risks are not well understood and managed in a timely and effective manner. Stress tests 
have been identified as means whereby investors’ uncertainty about the quality of bank balance 
sheets, could be eliminated.64
The Committee's acknowledgement of negative incentives arising from the use of external ratings to 
determine regulatory capital requirements and proposals to mitigate these incentives  65 is well - 
founded – however, regulators will also be able to manage, with greater ability, systemic risks to the 
financial system during such periods when firms which are highly leveraged become reluctant to 
56See Bank for International Settlements „Proposed Enhancements to the Basel II Framework: Revisions to Pillar 3“ 
(Market Discipline)“ Consultative Document , Basel Committee on Banking Supervision paragraph 73 at page 23
57See „Enhancements to the Basel II Framework“ Basel Committee on Banking Supervision publications July 2009 at 
page 29 http://www.bis.org/publ/bcbs157.pdf and < http://www.bis.org/publ/bcbs157.pdf?noframes=1>
58Ibid at page 10
59ibid
60See B Arrunada, “The Provision of Non Audit Services by Auditors: Let the Market Evolve and Decide” 1999 
International Review of Law and Economics at page 13. According to Arrunada, regulators should not only focus on 
policies which would improve transparency of information – hence enhancing market incentives, but should strive 
towards fostering a greater level of competition. Markets, in his opinion, should be the “driving force behind the 
evolution of the industry” – since regulators are not well equipped with the necessary knowledge and proper incentives 
which are required for defining an efficient market framework.
61 See „Enhancements to the Basel II Framework“ Basel Committee on Banking Supervision publications July 2009 at 
page 12
62ibid
63ibid
64See European Commission, “Economic Crisis in Europe: Causes, Consequences and Responses” Section 3.2.1’ Crisis 
Resolution Policies: Stress Testing of Banks” 
<http://ec.europa.eu/economy_finance/publications/publication15887_en.pdf> It is also highlighted in the report that 
stress tests could serve as “decisive tools in accomplishing this task since they provide information about banks’ 
resilience and ability to absorb possible shocks.”
65 See  Consultative Document of the Basel Committee for Banking Supervision, “Strengthening the Resilience of the 
Banking Sector” December 2009at page 55
lend  where  more  market  participants  such  as  credit  rating  agencies,  could  be  engaged  in  the 
supervisory process.66 The Annex to Pro cyclicality in the Accompanying Document amending the 
Capital Requirements Directive67 not only importantly emphasises the fact that regulatory capital 
requirements do not constitute the sole determinants of how much capital banks should hold, but 
also highlights the role of credit rating agencies in compelling banks to increase their capital levels 
even where such institution may be complying with regulatory requirements.
Further  as  rightly  acknowledged  by the  Committee,  “recent  experience  has  shown that  banks’ 
internal credit models have not performed well. Permitting banks to use their own internal models 
to estimate the capital requirements for securitisation exposures could increase pressure to permit 
the use of such models in Basel II more broadly. Thus, while there have been concerns expressed 
about the use of external ratings under the Basel II framework, including that reliance on external 
ratings could undermine incentives to conduct independent internal assessments of the credit quality 
of exposures, the removal of external ratings from the Basel II framework could raise additional 
issues for determining regulatory capital requirements.“68
C. Conclusion
As well as the inability of bank capital adequacy requirements, on their own, to address funding and 
liquidity problems, the need for greater focus on Pillar 3 of Basel II, namely, market discipline, and 
growing justification for greater measures aimed at extending capital rules to the securities markets, 
are factors which are becoming more apparent. 
Even though markets should be allowed to evolve, checks and controls should exist to ensure that 
such market activities are effectively managed and controlled. Management information systems 
(MIS) and banks’ credit risk models should be flexible (and not overly sensitive) in order to adapt to 
the  evolving  market  whilst  providing  for  some  element  of  control.  The  Basel  Committee 
furthermore,  acknowledges  the  role  assumed  by  management  information  systems  and  risk 
management processes in assisting the bank “to identify and aggregate similar risk exposures across 
the firm, including legal entities, and asset types (eg loans, derivatives and structured products).”69
The operation of risk mitigants in bank institutions does not justify a reduction in the capital levels 
to be retained by such banks – since banks operating with risk mitigants could still be considered 
inefficient operators of their management information systems (MIS), internal control systems, and 
risk management processes. The fact that banks possess risk mitigants does not necessarily imply 
66See M Ojo, ' 'Extending the Scope of Prudential Supervision: Regulatory Developments During and Beyond the 
'Effective' Periods of the Post BCCI and the Capital Requirements Directives' (January 2010), forthcoming in the 
Journal of Advanced Research in Law and Economics. 
67Accompanying Document to the Proposal for a Directive of the European Parliament and of the Council amending Capital 
Requirements Directive on trading book, securitisation issues and remuneration policies.< 
http://ec.europa.eu/internal_market/bank/docs/regcapital/com2009/impact_assesment_en.pdf> See page 46 of 47
68 See  Consultative Document of the Basel Committee for Banking Supervision, “Strengthening the Resilience of the 
Banking Sector” December 2009 paragraph 185 at page 56; for further information on the strengths and weaknesses of 
banks' internal credit models, also see M Ojo, 'The Responsive Approach by the Basel Committee (on Banking 
Supervision) to Regulation: Meta Risk Regulation, the Internal Ratings Based Approaches and the Advanced 
Measurement Approaches (2009)http://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/16752/ and  http://ssrn.com/abstract=1447446
69See „Enhancements to the Basel II Framework“ Basel Committee on Banking Supervision publications July 2009 
paragraph 29 < http://www.bis.org/publ/bcbs157.pdf?noframes=1> at page 16.The Basel Committee attributes the 
increased likelihood that different sectors of a bank are exposed to a common set of products, risk factors or counter 
parties, to the growth of market based intermediation.
that  they are  complying with Basel  Core Principles  for  effective supervision (particularly Core 
Principles 7 and 17). Core Principle 7 not only stipulates that “banks and banking groups satisfy 
supervisory  requirements  of  a  comprehensive  management  process,  ensure  that  this  identifies, 
evaluates, monitors and controls or mitigates all material risks and assesses their overall capital 
adequacy  in  relation  to  their  risk  profile,  but  that  such  processes  correspond  to  the  size  and 
complexity of the institution.” Certain incentives which assume the form of capital reductions are 
considered by the Basel Committee to “impose minimum operational standards in recognition that 
poor management of operational risks (including legal risks) could render such risk mitigants of 
effectively little or no value and that although partial mitigation is rewarded, banks will be required 
to hold capital against residual risks”.
Information disclosure should be encouraged for several reasons, amongst which include the fact 
that  imperfect  information is  considered  to  be a  cause of  market  failure  –  which “reduces  the 
maximisation potential of regulatory competition”, and also because disclosure requirements would 
contribute to the reduction of risks which could be generated when granting reduced capital level 
rewards to banks who may have poor management systems.
Response to Consultative Document –
International Framework For Liquidity Risk Measurement, Standards  and 
Monitoring
A. Introduction
The Basel  Committee’s  recent  focus  is  reflected  through its  goals  of  not  only intensifying  the 
“resilience of internationally active banks to liquidity stresses”, but also intensifying international 
harmonisation of liquidity risk supervision. These efforts are aimed at consolidating recent work 
which  culminated  in  the  issue  of  the  Principles  for  Sound  Liquidity  Risk  Management  and 
Supervision.70
As part of measures aimed at facilitating “further consolidation and promotion of consistency in 
international  liquidity  risk  supervision”,  and  in  response  to  the  “inaccurate  and  ineffective 
management of liquidity risk” – such ineffective management being a prominent feature of the 
financial crisis, the Basel Committee has developed a minimum set of monitoring tools to be used 
in  the  “ongoing  monitoring  of  the  liquidity  risk  exposures  of  cross  border  institutions  and  in 
communicating these exposures amongst home and host supervisors.”71
This  paper  is  structured  in  accordance  with  identified  components  which  are  considered  to  be 
essential  to  the  successful  implementation  of  the  (two fold)  topics  of  discussion of  this  paper, 
namely,  monitoring  and  liquidity  risk  measurements.  The  importance  of  successfully 
communicating  results  obtained  from  monitoring  and  measuring  such  risks,  and  the  role  of 
corporate  governance  in  ensuring  such  effective  communication,  constitutes  a  recurring  theme 
throughout  this  paper.  The  identified  components  are  as  follows:  i)  Corporate  governance  (ii) 
Internal controls (iii) Disclosure (iv) Management of risk (v) Substance over form (vi) Transparency
As well as highlighting the interdependence of these components, the paper also aims to accentuate 
the importance of individual components. Whilst no hierarchy of importance is assigned to these 
components, corporate governance and internal controls are two components which are analysed in 
greater  depth (than other  components).  Furthermore,  corporate governance could be accorded a 
status of greater importance than internal controls  having regard to the fact  that  whilst  internal 
controls relate to a very vital control aspect of an organisation, corporate governance relates to all 
processes – be it decision making, control, production, performance, within a company/bank.
Disclosure  and  transparency  embody  the  same  goals,  whilst  the  effective  management  and 
measurement of risks, and liquidity risks in particular, are aims which the internal control function 
and management should strive to achieve.  The theme “substance over form” draws attention to 
creative accounting practices  and the need for greater  emphasis  on principles  based regulation. 
Creative accounting and “window dressing” of figures in the financial statements are ever recurring 
issues arising from corporate collapses – as also recently highlighted by the recent crises which 
involved Lehman Brothers.
Whilst the danger of formalism lies in the exercise of “creative compliance”,72 inherent problems of 
70See Basel Committee on Banking Supervision, Consultative Document „International Framework for Liquidity Risk 
Measurement, Standards and Monitoring < http://www.bis.org/publ/bcbs165.htm> at page 2
71ibid
72Creative compliance being the use of rules to escape control without actually violating those rules
anti formalism are considered to include:73
- The fact  that  citizens  have  the  right  to  know exactly  what  is  prohibited  in  advance  of 
behaviour rather than in retrospect
- That broad rules are imprecise and over inclusive
- That anti formalism could result in ineffective control - where it is impossible to implement
Principles based regulation (PBR) is more advantageous than a rules based approach – owing to the 
fact that off balance74 sheet debt could result from the direct application of rules – without being 
able to consider the substance of the transaction and because the implemented standards do not 
allow such consideration.  As its  secondary argument75,  this  paper will  seek to demonstrate  that 
detailed rules could still operate within a system of principles based regulation – whilst enabling a 
consideration of the substance of the transactions which are involved.
Regulatory standards implemented by the Basel Committee in its recent document76 provide for 
“jurisdiction-specific  conditions”  –  for  example,  the  percentage  of  potential  run-off  of  retail 
deposits  which  is  partially  dependent  on  the  structure  of  a  jurisdiction’s  deposit  insurance 
scheme.”77 Furthermore, the Committee highlights that “in these cases, the parameters should be 
transparent  and clearly outlined in the regulations of each jurisdiction.”78 It  also adds that this 
would provide clarity both within the jurisdiction as well as across borders concerning the precise 
parameters  that  the  banks  are  capturing  in  these  metrics,  and  that  there  was  need  for  public 
disclosures in respect of regulatory standards.79
Good corporate governance would “provide proper incentives for the board and management to 
pursue objectives that are in the interests of the company and its shareholders.”80 The dual faceted 
aspects  of  corporate  governance  relate  not  only  to  the  accountability  of  management  to 
shareholders,  but  also  to  the  supervision  and  monitoring  of  management  performance.  Good 
corporate  governance  should  facilitate  effective  monitoring,  effective  management  of  internal 
controls and risks, effective disclosure and transparency.
In considering the topics of discussion, namely, liquidity risk measurements and monitoring, this 
paper will commence with a section dedicated to liquidity risk (and risk measurements), along with 
developments which have triggered the need for particular monitoring tools  - both in response to 
global developments and with particular reference to the increasing prominence of liquidity risks.
The ever growing prominence and importance of liquidity in prudential supervision constitutes a 
vital reason which justifies the need for a prudential supervisory framework which does not merely 
(and excessively) rely on capital adequacy requirements within such a framework.
73V Beattie, S Fearnley and R Brandt Behind Closed Doors: What Company Audit is Really About 
(ICAEW) 2001 at page 11
74Off balance sheet items are obligations which are contingent liabilities of a company/bank – and which as a result, do 
not appear on its balance sheet. Formal distinction between on and off balance sheet items, even though sometimes 
detailed, depend to an extent on the degree of judgement which is exercised by management.
75 The primary theme being the importance of successfully communicating results obtained from monitoring and 
measuring such risks, and the role of corporate governance in ensuring such effective communication.
76  See Consultative Document, „International Framework for Liquidity Risk Measurement, Standards and Monitoring“ 
at page 2
77 ibid
78 ibid
79 ibid
80 See Basel Committee on Banking Supervision “Enhancing Corporate Governance for Banking Organisations” 
February 2006 at page 4
Some arguments which revolve around the inadequacies of capital adequacy standards include the 
fact that:81
“Capital ratios may be of limited value as indicators of actual risk since reported capital positions 
do not reflect the real causes of most bank failures ( the real causes of bank failures being fraud or 
fast  depletion  of  the  banks’ resources).  The  international  minimum  ration  of  8%  lacks  any 
theoretical justification. Risk related measurement of bank assets is not only deeply flawed, but also 
triggers substantial distortions in the relative demand for bank assets. Since banks are in direct 
competition with investment firms, so far as securities activities are concerned, the imposition of 
capital burdens on banks erodes their ability to compete.”
Paragraph 56 of the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision’s Principles for Sound Liquidity Risk 
Management and Supervision states that 
“A bank should have a reliable management information system designed to provide the board of 
directors,  senior  management  and other  appropriate  personnel  with timely and forward-looking 
information on the liquidity position of the bank. The management information system should have 
the  ability  to  calculate  liquidity  positions  in  all  of  the  currencies  in  which  the  bank conducts 
business – both on a subsidiary/branch basis in all jurisdictions in which the bank is active and on 
an aggregate group basis. It should capture all sources of liquidity risk, including contingent risks 
and the related triggers and those arising from new activities, and have the ability to deliver more 
granular and time sensitive information during stress events. To effectively manage and monitor its 
net  funding requirements,  a  bank should have the ability to  calculate  liquidity positions  on an 
intraday basis, on a day-to-day basis for the shorter time horizons, and over a series of more distant 
time periods thereafter. The management information system should be used in day-to-day liquidity 
risk  management  to  monitor  compliance  with  the  bank’s  established  policies,  procedures  and 
limits.”82
B. Liquidity Risks
In February 2008, the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision published a paper titled “Liquidity 
Risk Management and Supervisory Challenges”, a paper which highlighted the fact that many banks 
had ignored the application of a number of basic principles of liquidity risk management during 
periods of abundant liquidity.83 An extensive review of its 2000 “Sound Practices for Managing 
Liquidity in Banking Organisations” was also carried out by the Basel Committee as a means of 
addressing matters and issues arising from the financial markets and lessons from the Financial 
Crises.84 In order to consolidate on the Basel Committee for Banking Supervision’s Principles for 
Sound  Liquidity  Risk  Management  and  Supervision  of  September  2008,  which  should  lead  to 
81 C Hadjiemmanuil, Banking Regulation and the Bank of England Lloyds of London Press 1995 at page 210
82 Basel Committee on Banking Supervision, Principles for Sound Liquidity Risk Management and Supervision 
Sept 2008 at page 17 <http://www.bis.org/publ/bcbs144.htm> Furthermore, paragraph 57 highlights the importance of a 
consensus  between senior  management  in  relation  to  a  set  of  reporting criteria  aimed at  facilitating liquidity risk 
monitoring. Such reporting criteria should specify ““the scope, manner and frequency of reporting for various recipients 
(such  as  the board,  senior  management,  asset  –  liability committee)  and  the  parties  responsible  for  preparing the 
reports.” “Reporting of risk measures should be done on a frequent basis (eg daily reporting for those responsible for 
managing liquidity risk, and at each board meeting during normal times, with reporting increasing in times of stress) 
and should compare current  liquidity exposures  to  established limits  to  identify any emerging pressures  and  limit 
breaches.  Breaches  in  liquidity  risk  limits  should  be  reported  and  thresholds  and  reporting  guidelines  should  be 
specified for escalation to higher levels of management, the board and supervisory authorities.”
83 Basel Committee on Banking Supervision, Principles for Sound Liquidity Risk Management and Supervision 
Sept 2008 <http://www.bis.org/publ/bcbs144.htm>
84 ibid
improved management and supervision of liquidity risks of individual banks, supervisory bodies 
will be required “ to develop tools and policies to address the pro cyclical behaviour of liquidity at 
the aggregate level.85
The Principles for Sound Liquidity Risk Management and Supervision of September 2008 are aimed 
at providing “consistent supervisory expectations” on principal elements such as “board and senior 
management oversight; the establishment of policies and risk tolerance; the use of liquidity risk 
management tools such as comprehensive cash flow forecasting, limits and liquidity scenario stress 
testing;  and  the  maintenance  of  a  sufficient  cushion  of  high  quality  liquid  assets  to  address 
contingent liquidity needs.”86
The  three  aspects  to  pro  cyclicality87 –  as  highlighted  in  the  Impact  Assessment  Document 
amending the Capital Requirements Directive, have the potential to trigger a chain reaction. Starting 
with remuneration schemes, the impact of these on management incentives, could have a positive or 
negative effect on bank regulations (such as Basel II or the CRD). Such regulations could then 
mitigate or exacerbate pro cyclical effects – depending on the effectiveness of capital adequacy 
rules. A positive effect of such rules would reduce the tendency of banks to cut back on lending 
during economic “busts” whilst incentives to retain liquidity would be increased – hence reducing 
the likelihood of the occurrence of maturity mismatches.
The link between liquidity and systemic risks as illustrated in the ECB’s Financial Stability Review, 
is attributed to the “destruction of specific knowledge88 which banks have about their
borrowers and the reduction of the common pool of liquidity.”89 The importance of the link between 
liquidity risks and systemic risks within the banking sector is  highlighted by the consequences 
attributed to the reluctance of banks to retain liquidity - given the cost of holding liquidity.90 The 
consequential shortfalls of liquidity as reflected by on and off balance
sheet maturity mismatches accentuates the importance of the role assumed by central banks in
the funding of bank balance sheets.91
The link between liquidity and systemic risks is also accentuated under paragraph 77 of the BCBS 
Principles for Sound Liquidity Risk Management and Supervision of September 2008. Principle 8 
states that:
“A bank should actively manage its  intraday liquidity positions and risks to meet payment and 
settlement  obligations  on  a  timely  basis  under  both  normal  and  stressed  conditions  and  thus 
contribute to the smooth functioning of payment and settlement systems.”
85 “The FSF proposes that the BCBS and CGFS develop a joint research effort to address funding and liquidity 
risk, starting in 2009. A key component of this research agenda is to define robust measures of funding and liquidity 
risk, which could assist assessments of liquidity risk by the private sector. Stress tests to gauge the probability and 
magnitude of a liquidity crisis in different market environments will be considered in this light.” For further information 
on this, see Report of the Financial Stability Forum on Addressing Pro cyclicality in the Financial System: Measuring 
and Funding Liquidity Risk” http://www.financialstabilityboard.org/publications/r_0904a.pdf at page 24
86 See Basel Committee on Banking Supervision, Consultative Document “International Framework for Liquidity 
Risk, Measurement Standards and Monitoring” Bank for International Settlements  Publications at page 1
87 Namely: systemic aspects, bank regulations and remuneration policies
88 Since specific knowledge which banks possess about their borrowers is considered to be a factor which determines 
the illiquidity of bank loans; see “The Concept of Systemic Risk” ECB Financial Stability Review December 2009 at page 
137<http://www.ecb.int/pub/fsr/shared/pdf/ivbfinancialstabilityreview200912en.pdf?05d3164914c6a14bb13522
2b5c3894fa>
89 ibid; According to the Review, the reduction in the common pool of liquidity also has the potential to trigger the 
failure of banks and could consequently lead to a devaluation of illiquid bank assets and further aggravation of problems 
within the banking sector.
90 Report of the Financial Stability Forum on “Addressing Pro cyclicality in the Financial System: Measuring and 
Funding Liquidity Risk” http://www.financialstabilityboard.org/publications/r_0904a.pdf at page 24
91 ibid
Paragraph 7792 elaborates on this by highlighting the reasons why “intraday liquidity management” 
constitutes an important component of a bank’s “broader liquidity management strategy.” It goes on 
to state that a bank’s failure to manage intraday liquidity effectively could result in its inability to 
meet payment obligations as they fall due, - hence generating consequences, not only for its own 
liquidity position, but also that of other parties. It illustrates how this could occur in two ways, 
namely: 
- “The fact that that counter parties may view the failure to settle payments when expected, as a 
sign of financial weakness – which in turn could result not only in payments to the bank being 
delayed or withheld, but also in further aggravation of liquidity pressures.
- It  also could leave counterparties unexpectedly short  of funds,  impair  those counterparties’ 
ability  to  meet  payment  obligations,  and  disrupt  the  smooth  functioning  of  payment  and 
settlement systems. Given the interdependencies that exist among systems, a bank’s failure to 
meet certain critical payments could lead to liquidity dislocations that cascade quickly across 
many systems and institutions. If risk controls are overwhelmed, these dislocations could alter 
many banks’ intraday or overnight funding needs, including their demands for central bank 
credit,  and  potentially  affect  conditions  in  money markets.  The  delay of  other  less  critical 
payments  also might  cause other  institutions  to  postpone  their  own payments,  cause  many 
banks to face increased uncertainty about their overnight funding needs and potentially increase 
the impact of any operational outages.”
Liquidity is considered to be “highly procyclical, growing in good times and drying up in times of 
stress.”93 During the build up to the present crisis,  banks and other financial institutions had an 
incentive to minimise the cost of holding liquidity.94 Given the fact that liquidity could also be pro 
cyclical and given its role in the recent crisis, perhaps four dimensions to pro cyclicality should 
have been introduced in the Impact Assessment Document95 amending the Capital Requirements 
Directive – incorporating liquidity as a fourth heading.
The growing importance of formalisation within the bank regulatory framework is also attributed to 
the gaps which exist within a discretionary based system of bank supervision – as was revealed in 
the aftermath of Baring Plc’s collapse. The recent crisis has also highlighted the need for formal risk 
assessment models – as demonstrated by the demise of Lehman Brothers where the failures of 
auditors to detect balance sheet irregularities (owing to  creative accounting practices) was brought 
to light.
The formal framework for the measurement of capital adequacy at European Community level, as 
exemplified  by  the  International  Convergence  of  Capital  Measurements  and  Capital 
Standards(Revised Framework), namely Basel 2, is to be commended, not only because of “the 
need  for  a  consistent  framework  for  the  reporting  and  comparative  analysis  of  bank  capital 
positions, the demand of regulated institutions for transparency and equality in the application of 
regulatory standards”, but also because of “the exigencies of the international convergence process 
– which requires the transparent and uniform implementation of harmonised rules by the regulators 
92 Principles for Sound Liquidity Risk Management and Supervision  Sept 2008 at pages 20 and 21
93 See Report of the Financial Stability Forum on Addressing Pro cyclicality in the Financial System “Measuring and 
Funding Liquidity Risk” at page 24
94 ibid
95 See Accompanying Document to the Proposal for a Directive of the European Parliament and of the Council 
amending Capital Requirements Directive on trading book, securitisation issues and remuneration policies.< 
http://ec.europa.eu/internal_market/bank/docs/regcapital/com2009/impact_assesment_en.pdf> See page 44-46
of every country.”96
As part of measures aimed at consolidating and “promoting consistency in international liquidity 
risk supervision”, and in response to the “inaccurate and ineffective management of liquidity risk” – 
as  was  prominently  highlighted  during  the  recent  financial  crisis,  the  Basel  Committee  has 
developed a “minimum set of monitoring tools to be used in the ongoing monitoring of the liquidity 
risk exposures of cross border institutions and in communicating these exposures amongst home 
and host supervisors.”97
The Liquidity Coverage Ratio98 and the Net Stable Funding Ratio99 are two regulatory standards for 
liquidity  risk  which  serve  the  purpose  of  attaining  the  objectives  of  “promoting  short-term 
resiliency of the liquidity risk profile of institutions” (by ensuring that they have adequate high 
quality liquid resources to survive during periods of extreme stress which last for about one month) 
and “promoting resiliency over longer-term periods” ( through the creation of additional incentives 
for banks to fund their activities with more stable sources of funding on an ongoing basis).100
In addition to the above-mentioned standards, the Basel Committee recommends that supervisors 
also implement designated monitoring tools on a consistent basis. Such monitoring tools, along with 
the  standards,  are  intended  to  provide  supervisors  with  information  which  should  aid  their 
assessment  of  liquidity  risks  attributed  to  a  particular  bank.101 These  monitoring  tools  include: 
Contractual Maturity Mismatch, Concentration of Funding,  Available Unencumbered Assets and 
market – related monitoring tools.102
C. Disclosure 
As well as the need for greater focus on liquidity risk, there is also the need for greater reliance on 
disclosure requirements. This will be facilitated through an effective monitoring process whereby 
identified risks are effectively communicated across all levels of management.
Enhanced  transparency does  not  only  have  the  potential  to  “improve  an  understanding  of  the 
mechanism at play in structured finance”, but also facilitate the identification of risks and ensure 
that  risks are  well  controlled.  103 Risky loans  which were “repackaged and sold to institutional 
investors” – some of whom did not fully comprehend the implications of the transactions they were 
engaged in (or about to be engaged in), and the inherent risks associated with those transactions, are 
considered to be contributory factors to the 2007/09 Financial Crisis.104
Regulators will be able to gain greater access to vital information which is required for effective 
96 See C Hadjiemmanuil, Banking Regulation and the Bank of England Lloyds of London Press 1995 at pages 
208-209
97 See Bank for International Settlements, Consultative Document “International Framework for Liquidity Risk, 
Measurement Standards and Monitoring” at page 2
98 This ratio „identifies the amount of unencumbered, high quality liquid assets an institution holds that can be 
used to offset the net cash outflows it would encounter under an acute short-term stress scenario by supervisors.“ ibid at 
page 3
99 This ratio measures “the amount of longer-term, stable sources of funding utilised by an institution relative to 
the liquidity profiles of the assets being funded and the potential for contingent calls on funding liquidity arising from 
off-balance sheet commitments and obligations.“ ibid
100 ibid
101 ibid at page 25
102 ibid
103 See speech by C McCreevy European Commissioner for Internal Market an Services at the European Parliament 11 
Sept 2007 http://europa.eu/rapid/pressReleasesAction.do?
reference=SPEECH/07/520&format=HTML&aged=l&language=EN&guiLanguage=en
104 ibid
performance of their functions where duties are imposed on third parties, such as external auditors, 
in  relation  to  the  disclosure  of  information  which  is  necessary  and  required  for  the  efficient 
performance of the regulators’ activities – as opposed to a right to report.
The relationship between supervisory authorities and the external auditors of a credit institution and 
the duties of these auditors was identified as an important lesson from the BCCI case.105 Because of 
auditors’ access to financial undertakings’ accounts and other essential documents and information, 
they assume a vital position in the overall supervisory process. An analysis of BCCI revealed that 
measures, additional to those already existing, needed to be taken to eliminate the opaqueness of 
financial  structures  and  strengthen  cooperation  between  all  bodies  or  persons  involved  in  the 
supervision of such complex financial structures.106
As a result, the Basel Committee for Banking Supervision issued “minimum standards” which lay 
down rules for effective consolidated supervision and cooperation between supervisory authorities. 
This was not only aimed at strengthening international co operation between prudential supervisors, 
but also to improve transparency of financial, and in particular, group structures.
D. The Importance of Effective Management of Internal Controls
“Banks identified as having control problems have been characterised by organisational structures 
in which responsibilities were not clearly defined: hence (1) No senior management monitored the 
performance of activities (carried out within the organisation) closely to observe unusual activities 
2) No senior management had a comprehensive understanding of the activities and how profits were 
being generated.”107
The collapse of Barings in1995 which was attributed not only to lack of quality and employee 
deception,  also  brought  the  issue  of  internal  controls  and  management  systems  to  the  fore.108 
Barings collapse illustrated weaknesses in the bank regulator’s supervisory regime - which included 
flaws  within  its  evaluation  of  internal  controls  at  banks,  flaws  inherent  in  the  internal 
communication within levels of management of the bank regulator, and the weaknesses in the way 
the bank regulator’s existing rules were applied.109
 The  Basel  Committee  categorised  into  five  groups,  types  of  control  breakdowns  which  are 
characteristic of ailing banks and these are as follows:110
- Lack of adequate management oversight and accountability, and failure to develop a strong 
control culture within the bank111
105 JF Mogg, ‚The Bank of England and the Development of Internal Control Systems’ in R Kinsella (ed) Internal 
Controls in Banking (Oak Tree Press Dublin 1995) at page 31
106 ibid at page 28
107 See “Framework for Internal Control Systems in Banking Organisations”, Basel Committee for Banking Supervision 
1998 at page 27
108 Whilst it is contended by some that the problems attributed to Barings focussed round the lack of controls, the 
system of internal controls which operated were also considered by the regulator at the time (the Bank of England) to be 
informal but effective. See Barings Bank and International Regulation Volume 1 (12 December 1006) at page xiii
109 See Treasury Committee, Barings Bank and International Regulation Report No 1 1996 page xv
110 See Framework for Internal Control Systems in Banking Organisations, Basel Committee for Banking 
Supervision 1998 at pages 6 and 7
111 In order to evaluate the quality of internal controls, supervisors could adopt a number of approaches which include i) 
the evaluation of the work of the internal audit department of the bank (though review of its working papers – including 
the methodology implemented in identifying, measuring, monitoring and controlling risks). ii) If supervisors are 
satisfied with the quality of the internal audit department’s work, they could use the reports of internal auditors as a 
- Inadequate recognition and assessment of the risk of certain banking activities, whether on or 
off balance sheet
- The absence or failure of key control structures and activities such as segregation of duties, 
approvals, verifications, reconciliations and reviews of operating performance
- Inadequate communication of information between levels of management within the bank – 
particularly the communication of information to higher ranked officials (senior management)
- Inadequate or ineffective audit programmes and monitoring activities
E. The  Contribution  of  Corporate  Governance  to  an  Effective  System  of  Internal 
Controls
Various corporate collapses have resulted in changes to financial reporting, corporate governance 
and audit.112 The emphasis on internal controls and risk management emerged from realisation that 
due  to  change  in  the  business  environment,  even  effective  safeguards  may  be  insufficient  to 
eliminate all possibilities of failure.113
Keasy and Wright define corporate governance as the “examination of the structures and processes 
associated with production, decision making, control and so on within an organisation.”114 The two 
aspects  of  governance  are  considered  to  be  i)  Supervision  and  monitoring  of  management 
performance (the enterprise aspect) and ii) ensuring accountability of management to shareholders 
and other stakeholders (the accountability aspect).115
The feedback effects of corporate governance into the liquidity and systemic risk mechanisms are 
illustrated thus: 
“Poor corporate governance may contribute to bank failures, which could pose significant public 
costs and consequences due to their potential impact on any applicable deposit insurance systems 
and the possibility of broader macro economic implications, such as contagion risk and impact on 
payments  systems.  Furthermore,  poor  corporate  governance  could  result  in  markets  losing 
confidence in the ability of a bank to properly manage its assets and liabilities, including deposits, 
which could in turn, trigger a bank run or liquidity crisis.”116
primary mechanism for the identification of control problems in the bank (or for identifying areas of potential risk – 
areas which have not been recently reviewed by the auditors). iii)Further some supervisors may use a self-assessment 
process in which management reviews the internal controls on a business by business basis whilst  iv)other supervisors 
may require periodic external audits of key areas (given that supervisor defines the scope). Supervisors may ultimately 
combine one or more of the techniques highlighted under (i) - (iv) with own on site reviews or examinations of internal 
controls. See ibid at pages 22 and 23
112 House of Commons Select Committee on Treasury, Minutes of Evidence submitted by the Institute of 
Chartered Accountants in England and Wales as part of its inquiry into the arrangements for financial regulation of 
public limited companies at page 17
113 ibid
114 See K Keasy and M Wright, ‘Issues in Corporate Accountability and Governance: An Editorial’ Accounting 
and Business Research, 23 (91A) at page 291. OECD principles define corporate governance as involving “ a set of 
relationships between a company’s management, its board, its shareholders, and other stakeholders.”
115 V Beattie, S Fearnley and R Brandt Behind Closed Doors: What Company Audit is Really About (ICAEW) 
2001 at page 26
116 See Basel Committee on Banking Supervision “Enhancing Corporate Governance for Banking Organisations” 
February 2006 at page 4
As well  as a robust system of  internal  controls  (which incorporates  internal  and external  audit 
functions), the implementation of i) corporate values, codes of conduct, standards of appropriate 
behaviour  and  the  system  used  in  ensuring  compliance  with  these,  ii)  a  clear  allocation  of 
responsibilities and decision making authorities, iii)  the establishment of a system which would 
guarantee efficient interaction and collaboration between the board of directors, senior management 
and auditors, and iv) special monitoring of risk exposures where conflicts of interest are likely to be 
high, are considered to be crucial to ensuring that sound corporate governance operates within an 
organisation.117
Furthermore,  sound corporate  governance practices  are  considered to  require  “  appropriate  and 
effective legal, regulatory and institutional foundations.”118 Even though factors such as the system 
of business laws and accounting standards which prevail in respective jurisdictions are considered 
to  be  factors  which  operate  beyond  the  scope  of  banking  supervision,  the  inclusion  of  four 
important forms of oversight are considered sufficient not only in ensuring that appropriate checks 
and balances exist, but that an effective system of corporate governance can be achieved.119 The 
types of oversight include: 
“(1)  oversight  by the board of  directors  or  supervisory board;  (2)  oversight  by individuals  not 
involved in the day-to-day running of the various  business areas;  (3) direct  line supervision of 
different business areas; and (4) independent risk management, compliance and audit functions. In 
addition, it is important that key personnel are fit and proper for their jobs. “120
The contribution  and the  role  assumed by senior  management  in  ensuring that  internal  control 
systems are effectively managed, is reflected through the Principles for the Assessment of Internal 
Control  Systems.121 The  importance  of  monitoring  and  the  rectification  of  deficiencies  within 
internal  control  systems  is  reflected  under  principles  10-12.122 Principle  10  highlights  the 
importance  of  monitoring  on  a  frequent  and  ongoing  basis  whilst  principles  11  and  12  draw 
attention to the importance of effective collaboration and communication between highly trained 
competent staff, the board of directors, audit committees and senior management.123
According to paragraph 84 of the BCBS Principles for Sound Liquidity Risk Management and
Supervision of September 2008, internal coordination across business lines is vital towards ensuring 
that effective controls over liquidity outflows are achieved.124 In relation to examples of actions 
which supervisors could adopt , as means of responding to banks with liquidity risk management 
weaknesses or excessive liquidity risk, that which “requires actions by the bank to strengthen its 
management of liquidity risk through improvements in internal policies, controls or reporting to 
senior  management  and  the  board”  is  considered  to  have  the  greatest  potential  to  address 
deficiencies in a bank’s liquidity risk management process or liquidity position.125
117 Basel Committee for Banking Supervision, “ Enhancing Corporate Governance for Banking Organisations” 
2006 at page 4
118 ibid at page 5
119 ibid
120 ibid
121 See particularly Principles 1-3 which relate to management oversight and the control culture; ibid at pages 2 
and 3
122 ibid at page 4
123 ibid at pages 4 and 5
124 Paragraph 16, as well as other sections which address and relate to internal and risk controls in particular, are 
considered to have the greatest importance out of all the sections within the BCBS Principles for Sound Liquidity Risk 
Management and Supervision of September 2008
125 See paragraph 142 of BCBS Principles for Sound Liquidity Risk Management and Supervision of September 
2008
As observed by the Basel Committee,126 “most banks that have experienced losses from internal 
control problems did not effectively monitor their internal control systems. Often the systems did 
not  have  the  necessary  built-in  ongoing  monitoring  processes  and  the  separate  evaluations 
performed  were  either  not  adequate  or  were  not  acted  upon appropriately  by management.”127 
Furthermore it  highlights that  such failures to monitor adequately commence with a “failure to 
consider and react  to day-to-day information provided to line management and other personnel 
indicating unusual activity – such as exceeded exposure limits, customer accounts in proprietary 
business activities or lack of current financial statements from borrowers.”128
In implementing the regulatory standards and monitoring tools which are highlighted by the Basel 
Committee  in  its  consultative  document,129 a  supervisory  approach  which  not  incorporates  the 
expertise of external auditors, but which is also more inclined to an on site system based approach is 
recommended. In supporting this view, reference is made to lessons learned from the collapse of 
Barings where it was noted by the Treasury Committee that “it was due to the discretionary basis of 
the  supervisor’s  approach  to  supervision  that  there  was  limited  ability  to  detect  events  at 
Barings.”130
The regulatory standards and monitoring tools set out in the BIS Consultative Document131 are 
therefore supported on the basis of their ability to facilitate a more formal approach to supervision 
which would reduce the scope for flexibility (scope for creative accounting practices and “window 
dressing” of balance sheet figures) where an on – site approach to supervision is implemented.
F. On site and Off-site Supervision
Principle 21 of the Basel Core Principles for Effective Supervision, Supervisory Reporting states 
that  “Supervisors must have a means of collecting, reviewing and analysing prudential reports and 
statistical returns from banks on both a solo and a consolidated basis, and a means of independent 
verification of these reports, through either on-site examinations or use of external experts.”
According to Vieten132 bank regulation has followed two trends, namely: supervision has become 
increasingly formalized and dependent on quantitative tools, and secondly, regulatory duties are 
being pushed down a regulatory pyramid to include external auditors and to enlist the resources of 
regulatees.
External auditors, even though they do not constitute by definition, part of a banking organisation, 
immensely  impact  the  quality  of  internal  controls  “through  their  audit  activities  –  which  also 
includes  discussions  with  management  and  recommendations  for  improvement  to  internal 
controls.”133 “External auditors provide an important feedback on the effectiveness of the internal 
126 See “Monitoring Activities and Correcting Deficiencies” Framework for Internal Controls in Banking 
Organisations, Basel Committee on Banking Supervision 1998 at page 30
127 See ibid at paragraph 10
128 See ibid at paragraph 11
129 See Consultative Document ‚International Framework For Liquidity Risk Measurement, Standards and 
Monitoring December 2009
130 Treasury Committee Barings Bank and International Regulation Report No 1 (1996) at page xiv
131 Consultative Document ‚International Framework For Liquidity Risk Measurement, Standards and Monitoring 
December 2009
132 See HR Vieten, „Banking Regulation in Britain and Germany Compared: Capital Ratios, External Audit and 
Internal Controls“ (1997) at page 18
133 Framework for Internal Control Systems in Banking Organisations, page 25 Basel Committee on Banking 
control system.”134
Off site supervision is synonymous with monitoring and involves the regulator’s use of external 
auditors’ expertise. It also involves the receipt and analysis of financial statements and statistical 
returns submitted to the supervisors. Off site monitoring often has the benefits of being able to 
identify  potential  problems,  particularly  during  intervals  between  on-  site  inspections,  thereby 
providing early detection and acting as trigger for corrective action before problems become more 
serious.135
On  site  work  is  usually  done  by  the  examination  staff  of  the  bank  supervisory  agency  or 
commissioned  by  supervisors  but  may  be  undertaken  by  external  auditors.  Furthermore,  it  is 
contended that on-site examinations are frequently implemented by banking supervisory authorities 
which posses the legal basis or other arrangements to direct the scope of the work carried out by 
external auditors.136
Ongoing monitoring is contrasted with separate evaluations. It is highlighted that whilst ongoing 
monitoring  activities  not  only  provide  the  advantage  of  “quickly  detecting  and  correcting 
deficiencies in the system”, but are also most effective “when the system of internal control is 
integrated into the operating environment and produces regular reports for review,” that separate 
evaluations usually detect problems “only after the fact.”137 However separate evaluations also offer 
the  advantage  of  providing  an  organisation  with  “fresh  and  comprehensive”  insight  into  the 
effectiveness of monitoring activities  –  such activities  being undertaken by staff  from different 
departments which include the business function, financial control and internal audit.138
G. Monitoring Compliance and Enforcement
Principles Based Regulation
A discretionary based approach to regulation, whilst encouraging greater possibilities for regulatory 
capture, appears to be more congruent with principles based regulation. However it is possible to 
implement a system of regulation which combines increased formalised procedures and/or detailed 
rules - whilst giving due consideration to the substance of transactions.
“Principles provide the framework in which firms can organize their own processes to achieve the 
outcomes the regulator seeks – the regulator in turn, depends on firms to adopt an attitude to the 
regulatory regime (which is one which aims to go beyond minimal compliance with rules).”139
Principles based regulation is not only advantageous because it allows management of a bank or 
firm  to  take  into  consideration  the  substance  of  transactions,  but  because  “principles  impose 
Supervision 1998
134 ibid
135 See „The Relationship between Banking Supervisors and Banks’ External Auditors January 2002 paragraph 40 
page 11 <http://www.bis.org/publ/bcbs87.pdf?noframes=1>
136 See Framework for Internal Control Systems in Banking Organisations, Basel Committee for Banking 
Supervision 1998 at page 23
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139  See J Black, „Forms and Paradoxes of Principles Based Regulation“ LSE Law, Society and Economy Working 
Papers 13/2008 (2008) at page 9 http://www.lse.ac.uk/collections/law/wps/wps.htm  and 
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outcomes to be achieved – not detailed processes for achieving them.”140 As well as being linked to 
meta regulation, principles based regulation facilitates a system whereby principles “communicate 
regulatory objectives and promote behaviour which will achieve those objectives.”141
Principles based regulation, thus, would not only reduce the scope for “creative compliance” – since 
the substance of transactions should be considered by management,  but also has the benefit  of 
providing a more flexible and responsive approach to regulation as the subsequent section will seek 
to demonstrate.
Principles based regulation is considered to comprise of 3 elements, namely:142
• A particular type of rule
• A focus on outcomes and
• A focus on senior management responsibility in ensuring these outcomes are achieved
Furthermore,  three  forms  of  principles  based  regulation,  namely:  “formal  principles  based 
regulation; substantive principles based regulation and full principles based regulation”, have been 
suggested.143 For the purposes of this paper, focus will be restricted to substantive principles based 
regulation.
Five classes of regulatory practices which could characterise substantive principles based 
regulation include:144 “The particular  mode of  interpretation-  that  is,  the  approach taken in  the 
interpretative  process;  particular  enforcement  style;  an  orientation  to  outcomes;  a  relocation  of 
responsibilities  for  working out  the practical  application of  the  provisions;  and an  explicit  and 
developed reliance on management based regulation.”
The effectiveness of rules and regulation is dependent, not only on the monitoring processes and 
tools used in such processes, but also the effectiveness of the enforcement of those rules. For this 
reason,  focus  will  be  dedicated  to  the  second  characteristic  of  substantive  principles  based 
regulation– which is indeed a “critical” and defining feature of principles based regulation.
According to Black, the adoption of the “responsive” enforcement approach is justified on the basis 
that “neither negotiative approaches nor deterrence based approaches are effective on their own and 
that instead, regulators should implement a mixture of both, that is, first negotiate, then if the firm 
still does not deliver substantive compliance, regulators should gradually move up the enforcement 
pyramid, applying sanctions of increasing severity until it does.”145 She adds weight to  Baldwin’s 
argument146 by stating that “those who know what they are meant to be doing and are generally 
inclined to do it (“the well intentioned and well informed”) , are best dealt with using a negotiating 
strategy – which is easier to do using principles. In contrast, those who do not know what they are 
meant to be doing and even if they did, would not be inclined to do it (“the ill intentioned and ill 
informed”),  are  best  dealt  with  using  a  strategy  that  escalates  rapidly  up  the  enforcement 
pyramid.”147
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142 See J Black, „Forms and Paradoxes of Principles Based Regulation“ LSE Law, Society and Economy Working 
Papers 13/2008 (2008) at page 12
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145 See also I Ayres and J Braithwaite, Responsive Regulation (1992) Oxford University Press 
146See R Baldwin, Rules and Government (1995) Oxford : Clarendon Press
147 J Black, „Forms and Paradoxes of Principles Based Regulation“ LSE Law, Society and Economy Working Papers 
13/2008 (2008) at page 19; She argues that “in a regime with a tough, punitive approach in which every infraction is 
met with a sanction, principles based regulation (PBR) would not survive – this being the case, because there is greater 
This “responsive” approach, it is further argued, “is not contingent on any particular rule design and 
can operate in systems of i) highly detailed rules,  ii)  where the rules are mainly principles, iii) 
where there is a combination of both.”148
Having considered the forms, attributes and benefits of principles based regulation, the weaknesses 
inherent in this type of regulation are worth mentioning. Firstly, in relation to the all important aim 
of  ensuring  accountability  –  which  should  be  fostered  if  adequate  monitoring  procedures  are 
observed and carried out by the responsible levels of authority. Principles based regulation could 
serve as a hindrance towards ensuring accountability. In this respect, reference will be made to the 
seven paradoxes of principles based regulation – which are as follows:149
“i)  The  interpretative  paradox :  Different  interpretations  attributed  to  principles  could  result  in 
imprecise  and  general  terms  being  accorded  very  specific  interpretations  –  even  though 
principles are supposed to offer flexibility (where these are characterised by imprecise terms).
ii) The communicative paradox: Principles, whilst  facilitating communication,  could also hinder 
such communication. The paradox is attributed to the distinction between legal use of language 
and its ordinary use. 
iii) The compliance paradox: Principles provide scope for flexibility in compliance – however this 
could result in conservative and/or uniform behaviour by regulated firms.
iv) The supervisory and enforcement paradox: Principles require enforcement to provide them with 
credibility – however over-enforcement could result in their demise.
v) The internal management paradox: Principles based regulation has the potential to offer required 
flexibility for internal control systems to develop – and also the potential to overload them.
vi) Ethical paradox
vii) Trust paradox
A detailed consideration of the above mentioned paradoxes highlights the importance of having a 
clear understanding of the form of principles based regulation which is applicable to a particular 
bank or business. As highlighted under the substantive principles based regulation, “those who 
know what they are meant to be doing and are generally inclined to do it ( the well intentioned and 
well informed), are best dealt with using a negotiating strategy.” Hence a more draconian mode of 
enforcement , that is tougher sanctions, would not be best suited in facilitating compliance by such 
groups  –  such  sanctions  being  better  reserved  for  the  “ill  informed  and  ill  intentioned.” 
Furthermore, a tough punitive regime is one in which principles are unlikely to survive – even 
though detailed rules could still be implemented under principles based regulation.150
Hence the desired level of compliance required within a firm is best achieved having regard to the 
organisational structure which exists within an organisation – and to whether (as a result of a such 
determination), that organisation could be considered a suitable candidate for the application of 
principles  based  regulation.  Clear  delegation  and  segregation  of  duties  within  an  organisation 
would not only promote accountability, but would also facilitate a system where principles could be 
risk that firms will make the wrong assessment ie one with which the regulator does not agree.” Under principles based 
regulation, she argues further, “firms are required to think through the application of the provisions to particular 
situations to a far greater degree than they are with respect to a detailed rule – hence the higher probability that firms 
would make the wrong assessment .” See ibid at page 18
148 J Black, „Forms and Paradoxes of Principles Based Regulation“ LSE Law, Society and Economy Working Papers 
13/2008 (2008) at page 19; It is further argued that “Different rule types make it easier for regulatory officials to deal 
with certain types of regulated firms.”
149  See ibid at pages 25 -35
150  Refer to Formal Principles Based Regulation; ibid at page 12
applied and also facilitate monitoring procedures. Consequently, monitoring would also facilitate 
accountability  –  since  frequent  reviews  and  discussions  between  management  and  appropriate 
personnel  should increase an understanding of  the activities  carried out  by particular  divisions 
within the organisation.
H. CONCLUSION
Monitoring fosters transparency, which in turn fosters accountability. Monitoring of key risks, as 
well as periodic evaluations by the business lines and internal audit constitute a vital element of 
corporate  governance  – hence  the  overall  effectiveness  of  a  bank’s  internal  controls  should  be 
monitored on an ongoing and frequent151 basis.152 
Since  it  is  possible  for  detailed  rules  to  operate  under  principles  based  regulation  – and since 
detailed  rules  constitute  a  vital  element  in  ensuring  that  clear  delegation  and  segregation  of 
responsibilities exist within an organisation, it could be said that the level of accountability derived 
under principles based regulation is dependent on the form of principles based regulation. Under the 
formal principles based regulation, the level of accountability derived is likely to be greater than 
that derived under full principles based regulation. As highlighted within the relevant sections of 
this paper, an approach which combines negotiating and punitive strategies is always considered 
best – owing to the level of flexibility offered by such an approach. However the organisational 
structure, culture and several other factors require consideration before substantive principles based 
regulation is judged to be the optimal approach.
In accordance with Principle 13 of the Principles for the Assessment of Internal Control Systems, 
“supervisors should require that all banks, regardless of size, have an effective system of internal 
controls that is consistent with the nature, complexity, and risk inherent in their on- and- off balance 
sheet activities and that corresponds to the bank’s environment and conditions.” Furthermore, “in 
those instances where supervisors determine that a bank’s internal control system is not adequate or 
effective for that bank’s specific risk profile, they should take appropriate action.”  In accordance 
with  Core  Principle  17  of  the  Basel  Core  Principles  for  Effective  Bank  Supervision,  Internal  
controls and audit, specific attention should given to ensure the existence of: i )“clear arrangements 
for delegating authority and responsibility; (ii)separation of the functions that involve committing 
the bank, paying away its funds, and accounting for its assets and liabilities.”
Where  clear  delegation  of  authority,  segregation  of  responsibilities  are  not  in  place,  the  most 
appropriate and obvious action might be to initiate a more deterrence based approach – rather than a 
negotiative based approach. However, reference must be made to factors highlighted under the first 
paragraph of this conclusive section.
Increased formalisation under principles based regulation would still allow for a consideration of 
151 “The frequency of monitoring different activities of a bank should be determined by considering the risks involved 
and the frequency and nature of changes occurring in the operating environment.” See Framework for Internal Control 
Systems  in Banking Organisations at page 20 http://www.bis.org/publ/bcbs40.pdf
152 See also Principle 10 of the Principles for the Assessment of Internal Control Systems; Framework for Internal 
Control Systems  in Banking Organisations at page 20 http://www.bis.org/publ/bcbs40.pdf. “Monitoring the 
effectiveness of internal controls could be undertaken by personnel from several different areas, including the business 
function itself, financial control and internal audit. For that reason, it is important that senior management clarify which 
personnel are responsible for which monitoring functions.” Further, “monitoring should constitute part of the daily 
activities of the bank – whilst including separate periodic evaluations of the overall internal control process. ”;ibid
the  substance  of  transactions  – whilst  allowing for  flexibility  in  terms  of  its  application.  With 
regards to its application, this implies its suitability as the appropriate mode of regulation - based on 
the  level  of  accountability  it  could  provide  an  organisation  with  and whether  an  organisation, 
because of its structure and culture, should consider applying it at all.
Measures Aimed at Mitigating Pro Cyclical Effects of the Capital Requirements 
Framework: Counter cyclical Capital Buffer Proposals153
Introduction
In its consultative document on “Counter Cyclical Capital Buffer Proposal”154 the Basel Committee 
highlights the principal aim of the proposal, namely “ the implementation of buffers of capital to 
achieve the broader macro prudential goal of protecting the banking sector from periods of excess 
aggregate credit growth which have been linked to the build up of system wide risk.”155 A further 
benefit of the proposal which is attributed to the aim of protecting the banking sector from the credit 
cycle is its potential to assist in “leaning against the build-up phase” of the cycle in the first instance 
– this occurring (according to the Committee), through the capital buffer acting to raise the cost of 
credit – hence dampening and reducing its demand.156
This paper aims to highlight reasons attributed to the importance of introducing counter cyclical 
capital buffers – the principal focus being the need to mitigate pro cyclical effects. In so doing it 
commences with an introduction on how such pro cyclical effects arise and why they need to be 
addressed. The paper also illustrates that even though it is increasingly acknowledged that capital, 
on its own, cannot address system wide risks (owing to the growing importance and significance of 
liquidity risk), that current measures aimed at mitigating pro cyclical effects focus primarily on 
capital. Hence the need to introduce counter cyclical buffer proposals which are also linked to the 
redress of  liquidity risks, also constitutes an objective which the paper aims to address. Such need 
will be considered under the fourth section of this paper which considers recommendations made by 
the Financial  Stability Forum and which specifically (and importantly)  includes  bank loan loss 
provisions.  Thus  whilst  progress  with  measures  aimed  at  ensuring  that  banking  systems  are 
equipped with buffers of capital (to protect them against future losses) is very much appreciated, 
greater focus on other measures aimed at addressing losses and unforeseen problems attributed to 
“maturity transformation of short-term deposits into long term loans”157 (which exposes banks to 
such vulnerabilities as liquidity risks) are required.
One  of  the  principles  which  were  highlighted  by  the  Basel  Committee  as  constituting  vital 
components  of  a  “global  financial  stability  framework”  is  namely,  the  principle  that  “All 
macroeconomic policies need to be counter cyclical, building up buffers in good times that can be 
153 See Basel Committee for Banking Supervision , Bank for International Settlements Publications 
<www.biz.org/publ/bcbs172/mariannweojo.pdf>
154 See Basel Committee on Banking Supervision, „ Consultative Document: Counter Cyclical Capital Buffer Proposal“ 
July  2010  http://www.bis.org/publ/bcbs172.pdf?noframes=1 at  page  2.  The  Consultative  Document  interestingly 
highlights the fact that the Counter Cyclical Proposal is not a Pillar 2 approach – since “it does not relate to supervisor 
review of individual banks.” see ibid at page 12. Furthermore, the Consultative Document addresses the treatment of 
surplus when buffer returns to zero by indicating that “the Basel Committee’s working assumption is that the capital 
surplus created when the counter cyclical buffer is returned to zero, should be unfettered – that is, no restrictions should 
be imposed on distributions when the buffer is turned off.” See ibid at page 13
155 Further,  the Committee adds that  since capital  is  more expensive than other  forms of funding,  the build up of 
defences (such as capital defences which are built up by banks during periods where “the risks of system-wide stress” 
are characterised by significant and marked levels of growth) may provide the additional benefit of helping to stabilise 
excessive credit growth levels during periods of economic and financial booms. See ibid.
156 See ibid at page 3
157 See Principles for Sound Liquidity Risk Management and Supervision September 2008 at page 1 (page 7 of 44) 
<http://www.bis.org/publ/bcbs144.htm>
run down in bad times. In particular, fiscal authorities need to reduce debt levels in good times in 
order to have the capacity to respond at times of stress. “158
Whilst  it  is contended that monetary policies should be aimed at  the control of inflation,  fiscal 
policies are considered to have the role of “counter cyclical demand management.”159
A. Pro cyclicality160
Pro cyclicality is  a term used to  denote “  the self-reinforcing mechanisms within the financial 
system and between the financial system and the real economy that can exacerbate boom and bust 
cycles, undermining financial and macroeconomic stability. These effects are most prominent in the 
downward  phase.  As  strains  develop,  previously  unseen  risks  materialise,  deepening  the 
retrenchment that is already under way.”161 Furthermore, it is not only contended that “the effects of 
pro cyclicality are critical (but hidden) in the expansion phase, when the underlying risks build up, 
but that historical experience reveals that credit mistakes are made during the boom phase but are 
revealed only during the bust.” 
An example of a “fundamental” source of pro cyclicality as provided by the Committee of the 
European Banking Supervisors(CEBS),162 is attributed to “excessive risk-taking during periods of 
expansion, which results in the build up of vulnerabilities”.
Some of the recommendations put forward and highlighted as means of addressing pro cyclicality 
include:163
- A policy response founded on the build up and run down of capital buffers in a counter 
cyclical  fashion over the business cycle. These safety margins must be built  up in good 
times, when it is easier and cheaper to do so.164 Such a build-up will restrain risk-taking 
during the expansion phase of the business cycle. During periods of recession, these buffers 
can  be  run  down,  allowing  the  system  to  absorb  emerging  strains  more  easily  and 
dampening the feedback mechanisms. 
- The importance of distinguishing between the regulatory minimum capital requirement and 
buffers operating above the minimum requirements. A breach of the regulatory minimum 
158 See H Hannoun, „Towards a Global Financial Stability Framework“ Bank for International Settlements Publications, 
page 2 of 26 <http://www.bis.org/speeches/sp100303.pdf>
159 ibid at page 6. Furthermore, it is added that consideration should be given to “the need to maintain fiscal buffers that 
allow a response to financial system stress - which implies that government debt should be maintained at reasonably 
low levels in good times so that additional debt can be taken on in times of stress without unsettling financial markets.” 
See ibid at page 7
160 Pro cyclicality is also the tendency for periods of financial/economic downturns or booms to be further 
exacerbated by certain economic policies. For further considerations on the possible consequences of 
according a high degree of prominence to certain economic objectives, see M Ojo, „Social Rights and Economic 
Objectives: The Importance of Competition at Supra National Level „ http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?
abstract_id=1651610
161 See H Hannoun, „Towards a Global Financial Stability Framework“ Bank for International Settlements Publications, 
page 16 and 17 of 26 <http://www.bis.org/speeches/sp100303.pdf>
162 Furthermore, the CEBS defines pro cyclicality as comprising “mechanisms through which the financial system can 
amplify business fluctuations that are particularly disruptive during an economic downturn or when the financial system 
is faced with pressures.” See Committee of European Banking Supervisors, “Position Paper on a Counter Cyclical 
Capital Buffer” July 2009 at page 34
163 H Hannoun, „Towards a Global Financial Stability Framework“ Bank for International Settlements Publications, 
page 16 and 17 of 26
164 ibid; also see Bank for International Settlements, “Addressing financial system procyclicality: a possible 
framework”, Note for the FSF Working Group on Market and Institutional Resilience, April 2009. 
brings with it  severe consequences,  which could result  in  a bank being shut  down. The 
buffers are intended to be built up in good times so that they can absorb losses without the 
bank becoming insolvent.”
The Basel Committee has proposed building up these buffers through a combination of counter 
cyclical capital charges, forward-looking provisioning and capital conservation measures.165 It  is 
also recommended that other potential macro prudential instruments such as loan-to-value (LTV) 
ratios should be explored.
Jimenez and Saurina, Goodhart, Hofmann and Segoviano are amongst several other academics who 
have put forward proposals aimed at addressing pro cyclical problems.166 The proposal put forward 
by Jimenez and Saurina “focuses on an additional flow of loan loss provisions – in addition to 
specific and general provisions.”167 Such a design is aimed at addressing the “future increase in 
credit  risk deriving from too lenient credit standards during periods of economic booms.”168 As 
observed by the CEBS, whilst a similar proposal (to that of Jimenez and Saurina) was also put 
forward by Goodhart, Hofmann and Segoviano, some reservations on the potential and efficiency of 
the present applicable principle for policy intervention (that is, conserving buffers in the system 
during periods of economic booms – for the purposes of “controlled” utilisation of such buffers 
during periods of economic pressures), were expressed by Kashyap, Rajan and Stein.169 
The promotion of financial stability through more risk sensitive capital requirements, constitutes 
one  of  Basel  II’s  primary  objectives.170 However  some  problems  identified  with  Basel  II  are 
attributed to pro cyclicality and to the fact that not all material credit risks in the trading book are 
adequately accounted for in the current capital requirements.171 The pro cyclical nature of Basel II 
has  been  criticised since  “capital  requirements  for credit  risk as  a  probability  of  default  of  an 
exposure  decreases in  the  economic  upswing  and  increases  during  the  downturn”172 –  hence 
165 See H Hannoun, „Towards a Global Financial Stability Framework“ Bank for International Settlements Publications, 
page 16 of 26 http://www.bis.org/speeches/sp100303.pdf and also Basel Committee on Banking Supervision, 
Strengthening the resilience of the banking sector – consultative document, December 2009.
166 For further information on this see Committee of European Banking Supervisors, “Position Paper on a Counter 
Cyclical Capital Buffer” July 2009 at page 34. “Studies which were included and reviewed in the Dynamic Operation 
Project (DOP) of the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision (BCBS) – which addressed the issue of the cyclicality 
of Pillar One capital requirements include those of Goodhart, Hofmann and Segoviano along with Kashyap and Stein. 
The DOP report examined several academic papers that implemented simulation approaches to estimate the magnitude 
of the cyclical variations of Basel II requirement over the business cycle.” See ibid at page 33.
167 See ibid at page 33
168“Given that the provision is positive during periods of economic booms, and negative during periods of recessions, it 
is argued that such a provision should have a counter cyclical impact on banks’ lending policies.” ibid
169 It is acknowledged that “time-varying capital requirements represent a potentially important improvement over the 
current time invariant approach in Basel II because they allow some of the rainy day funds to be spent when it rains –  
thereby reducing the pressure on banks to liquidate assets (as well as associated negative spill overs for the rest of the 
economy.  However,  time  varying  capital  requirements  are  also  acknowledged  to  be  problematic  from  a  cost 
perspective” See ibid at page 36; see also Jimenez and Saurina , “Credit Cycles, Credit Risk, and Prudential Regulation” 
(2006) International Journal of Central Banking, vol.2, no.2; Goodhart, Hofmann and Segoviano , “Bank Regulation 
and Macroeconomic Fluctuations” (2004) Oxford Review of Economic Policy, vol. 20,no. 4; Kashyap, Rajan and Stein, 
“Rethinking  Capital  Regulation”,  Paper  prepared  for  the  Federal  Reserve  Bank  of  Kansas  City  symposium  on 
“Maintaining stability in a Changing Financial System”, Jackson Hole, August 2008.
170 For further objectives, see , Accompanying Document to the Proposal for a Directive of the European Parliament and 
of the Council amending Capital Requirements Directive on trading book, securitisation issues and remuneration 
policies. < http://ec.europa.eu/internal_market/bank/docs/regcapital/com2009/impact_assesment_en.pdf > at page 22 of 
47
171 See ibid at page 23 of 47
172 See Annex on Proc cyclicality, Accompanying Document to the Proposal for a Directive of the European Parliament 
and of the Council amending Capital Requirements Directive on trading book, securitisation issues and remuneration 
policies. < http://ec.europa.eu/internal_market/bank/docs/regcapital/com2009/impact_assesment_en.pdf> at page 46 of 
47
resulting in capital requirements which fluctuate over the cycle. Other identified173 consequential 
effects include the fact that fluctuations in such capital requirements may result in credit institutions 
raising their capital during periods when its is costly174 for them to implement such a rise – which 
has the potential of inducing banks to cut back on their lending. It is concluded that “risk sensitive 
capital requirements should have pro cyclical effects principally on undercapitalised banks.”175
Regulators will be able to manage systemic risks to the financial system during such periods when 
firms which are highly leveraged become reluctant to lend where more market participants such as 
credit rating agencies, could be engaged in the supervisory process. The Annex to Pro cyclicality in 
the Accompanying Document amending the Capital Requirements Directive176 not only importantly 
emphasises the fact that regulatory capital requirements do not constitute the sole determinants of 
how much  capital  banks  should  hold,  but  also  highlights  the  role  of  credit  rating  agencies  in 
compelling banks to increase their capital levels even where such institution may be complying with 
regulatory requirements.
The fact that “adjustments (for individual institutions’ contributions to systemic risk) would actually 
exacerbate  pro  cyclicality,  has  been  highlighted.177 A second and  further  consequence  of  using 
“certain  market  based  measures  of  systemic  risk  to  address  the  time  dimension”  is  that,  “the 
measures would provide the wrong signal:  Systemic risk would look low when, in fact,  it  was 
actually high.”178
Even though the implementation of higher levels of capital buffers could serve as a means for the 
management of systemic risks, liquidity requirements179 have also been acknowledged by many as 
having a fundamental role to play in mitigating contagion – hence assuming a role which is similar 
to that of capital buffers.180 The link between counter cyclical buffers, capital and liquidity standards 
is further demonstrated through the impact which is generated as a result of the implementation of 
capital and liquidity standards. Counter cyclical buffer schemes could serve as means of enhancing 
the following effects which are generated by higher capital and liquidity standards, namely:181
173 As identified in the Accompanying Document to the Proposal for a Directive of the European Parliament and of the 
Council amending Capital Requirements Directive on trading book, securitisation issues and remuneration policies. See 
page 46 of 47
174 Liquidity, a topic which will be addressed in the next section, is also considered to be “highly pro cyclical, growing 
in good times and drying up in times of stress.” During the build up to the present crisis, banks and other financial 
institutions had an incentive to minimise the cost of holding liquidity. See Report of the Financial Stability Forum on 
Addressing  Pro  cyclicality  in  the  Financial  System  “Measuring  and  Funding  Liquidity  Risk”  at  page  24 
http://www.financialstabilityboard.org/publications/r_0904a.pdf
175 See “Is Basel II Pro Cyclical? A Selected Review of the Literature” Financial Stability Review December 2009 at 
page 150
176 Accompanying Document to the Proposal for a Directive of the European Parliament and of the Council amending 
Capital Requirements Directive on trading book, securitisation issues and remuneration policies.< 
http://ec.europa.eu/internal_market/bank/docs/regcapital/com2009/impact_assesment_en.pdf> See page 46 of 47
177 See C Borio, “Implementing a Macro Prudential Framework : Blending Boldness and Realism” Bank for 
International Settlements Publications at page 8 <http://www.bis.org/repofficepubl/hkimr201007.12c.pdf?noframes=1>
178 ibid
179 “However, the analysis of the impact of liquidity standards is considered to present specific challenges. Under the 
Proposal put forward by the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision in December 2009, banks will be required to 
meet two new liquidity requirements – a short term requirement called the Liquidity Coverage Ration (LCR) and a long 
term requirement called the Net Stable Funding Ratio (NSFR). The Proposal focuses mainly on the NSFR – which is 
considered to be the more relevant constraint to macro economic effects on a longer term basis.” See Basel Committee 
on Banking  Supervision,  “An Assessment  of  the  Long Term Economic  Impact  of  Stronger  Capital  and  Liquidity 
Requirements”  Bank  for  International  Settlements  Publications  August  2010  at  page  7 
<http://www.bis.org/publ/bcbs173.pdf?noframes=1>
180 See particularly R Cifuentes, G Ferrucci and HS Shin, “Liquidity Risk and Contagion” (2005) Journal of the 
European Economic Association Volume 3 at pages 556-566 http://www.bri.org/bcbs/events/rtf04shin.pdf 
181 See Basel Committee on Banking Supervision, “An Assessment of the Long Term Economic Impact of Stronger 
- Making the financial system more resilient and:
- Reducing the amplitude of the business cycles within the financial system.
The association between systemic  risks  and liquidity risks  and the rather  apparent  lack  of  due 
recognition accorded to liquidity risks under Basel II, constituted other reasons for the growing 
criticism of Basel II.
B. Liquidity Risk
The definition of liquidity,  as provided by the Bank of International Settlements  (BIS),  is  “the 
ability  of  a  bank  to  fund increases  in  assets  and  meet  obligations  as  they come  due,  without 
incurring unacceptable losses.  The fundamental  role  of banks in the maturity transformation of 
short-term deposits into long-term loans makes banks inherently vulnerable to liquidity risk, both of 
an institution-specific nature and that which affects markets as a whole.”182
In their  report  on “Addressing Pro cyclicality in the Financial  System: Measuring and Funding 
Liquidity Risk”, the Financial Stability Forum (FSF) noted that at the onset of the recent financial 
crises, the complex response of financial institutions to deteriorating market conditions, was to a 
large extent, attributed to liquidity shortfalls which reflected “on and off balance sheet maturity 
mismatches and excessive levels of leverage.”183 This has resulted in an “increasingly important role 
for liquidity provided by central banks in the funding of bank balance sheets.”184 Furthermore, the 
FSF  highlighted  the  urgency  of  both  authorities,  namely,  supervisors  (in  their  monitoring  of 
liquidity risks at banks) and central banks (in their design and implementation of market operations) 
collaborating in order to “ restore the functioning of inter bank lending markets.”185
As identified in the ECB’s Financial Stability Review, “the specific knowledge that banks possess 
about their borrowers make bank loans particularly illiquid.”186 The connection between liquidity 
and systemic risks is further highlighted in the Review where it elaborates on possible consequences 
resulting from a bank’s  failure,  namely:187 The “destruction” of such specific knowledge which 
banks have about their borrowers and the reduction of “the common pool of liquidity.”188 Such 
reduction in the common pool of liquidity may also trigger the failure of other banks – with the 
result that i) the value of such illiquid bank assets diminishes and ii) further problems within the 
banking systems are aggravated.189
“Endogenous risks” could also be generated depending on the type of information which the bank 
possesses about their borrowers and how the dissipation of such information to the public, if it has 
the potential to trigger a bank run, can be prevented.
Capital and Liquidity Requirements” Bank for International Settlements Publications August 2010 at page 5 
<http://www.bis.org/publ/bcbs173.pdf?noframes=1>
182 Principles for Sound Liquidity Risk Management and Supervision  Sept 2008 at page 1 
<http://www.bis.org/publ/bcbs144.htm>
183Report of the Financial Stability Forum on “Addressing Pro cyclicality in the Financial System: Measuring and 
Funding Liquidity Risk” http://www.financialstabilityboard.org/publications/r_0904a.pdf at page 24
184ibid
185„In order to counter the transfer of funding liquidity risk by systemically important financial institutions to the public 
sector“ ;ibid
186 European Central Bank, “The Concept of Systemic Risk” Financial Stability Review December 2009 
http://www.ecb.int/pub/fsr/shared/pdf/ivbfinancialstabilityreview200912en.pdf?a3fef6891f874a3bd40cd00aef38c64f at 
page 137
187 ibid
188 ibid
189 ibid
According Greater Attention to Liquidity Risks
In February 2008, the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision published a paper titled “Liquidity 
Risk Management and Supervisory Challenges”, a paper which highlighted the fact that many banks 
had ignored the application of a number of basic principles of liquidity risk management  during 
periods of abundant liquidity.190
An  extensive  review  of  its  2000  “Sound  Practices  for  Managing  Liquidity  in  Banking 
Organisations” was also carried out by the Basel Committee as a means of addressing matters and 
issues arising from the financial markets and lessons from the Financial Crises.191 
In  order  to  consolidate  on  the BCBS  Principles  for  Sound  Liquidity  Risk  Management  and  
Supervision  of September 2008, which should lead to improved management and supervision of 
liquidity  risks  of  individual  banks,  supervisory  bodies  will  be  required  “to  develop  tools  and 
policies to address the pro cyclical behaviour of liquidity at the aggregate level”.192
In responding to the apparent gaps which exist with Basel II – as revealed by the recent crises, 
proposals which are aimed at imposing penalties for the occurrence of maturity mismatches193 have 
been  put  forward.194 The  degree  of  disparity  which  exists  between  the  maturity  of  assets  and 
liabilities  is  crucial  to  determining  the  state  of  a  company’s  liquidity.  Such penalties  aimed at 
deterring the occurrence of maturity mismatches could include “higher capital  requirements  for 
banks which finance their assets with overnight borrowing from the money markets than banks 
which finance similar assets with term deposits.”195
The inability  of  bank  capital,  on  its  own,  to  address  funding  and liquidity  problems has  been 
acknowledged by  many  academics.  As  a  result,  further  proposals,  in  addition  to  the  above 
mentioned  amendment  to  Basel  II,  have  been  put  forward.  These  include  the  coupling  of  the 
existing regulatory framework with capital insurance or liquidity insurance mechanisms.196 Such 
proposals are aimed at “giving banks the right incentives ex ante and at improving the resilience of 
the financial system to shocks  ex post.197 Furthermore, the ECB’s Financial Stability Review also 
190 Principles for Sound Liquidity Risk Management and Supervision  Sept 2008 
<http://www.bis.org/publ/bcbs144.htm>
191ibid
192  “The FSF proposes that the BCBS and CGFS develop a joint research effort to address funding and liquidity risk, 
starting in 2009. A key component of this research agenda is to define robust measures of funding and liquidity risk, 
which could assist assessments of liquidity risk by the private sector. Stress tests to gauge the probability and magnitude 
of a liquidity crisis in different market environments will be considered in this light.” For further information on this, 
see  Report of the Financial  Stability Forum on Addressing Pro cyclicality in the Financial System: Measuring and 
Funding Liquidity Risk” http://www.financialstabilityboard.org/publications/r_0904a.pdf at page 24
193 A situation which could occur where an undertaking possesses more short term liabilities than short term asset. 
It could also occur where more assets are held (than liabilities) for medium and long term obligations.
194 See “Is Basel II Pro Cyclical? A Selected Review of the Literature” Financial Stability Review December 2009 
at page 148 and particularly Brunnermeier et al whose proposal includes the requirement of greater capital, “not only 
against the risk of assets, but also against the risk of funding such assets.”
195 Ibid at 148
196 Brunnermeier et al, Kashyap et al, and Perrotti and Suarez are all of the opinion that even though 
liquidity assistance to help banks cope with aggregate liquidity shocks is commendable, it would generate 
minimal benefits where such banks are not provided with the right incentives to reduce the probability of such shocks in 
the first place. For further information on this, see “Is Basel II Pro Cyclical? A Selected Review of the Literature” 
Financial Stability Review December 2009 at page 149
197 ibid
highlights  proposals  which  are  aimed  at  supplementing  Basel  II  regulation  through  the 
establishment of a mandatory liquidity insurance arrangement - whereby each bank has to pay the 
supervisor a liquidity charge.198
Even though the Basel Committee states (in its Consultative Document) that its Counter Cyclical 
Capital Buffer Proposal is not a Pillar 2 approach “since it does not relate to the supervisor review 
of individual banks”199, the Committee of European Banking Supervisors (CEBS) highlights the 
fact that “whilst forward looking systems of capital buffers for banks should be designed within the 
boundaries  of  the  existing  framework  and  that  identified  mechanisms  could  be  employed 
alternatively under Pillar One, that its implementation under Pillar Two is still considered to be the 
most sensible option at the time.”200
The  Committee  of  European  Banking  Supervisors  classifies  Pillar  2  capital  buffers  into  two 
components – the first being aimed at “building sufficient additional resources (above regulatory 
minimum) whilst the second is aimed at “covering losses arising from extreme events.”201 Whilst 
the CEBS is also of the opinion that rating agencies appear to prefer Pillar One solutions (which are 
considered to be more transparent and less prone to national discretions), it also draws attention to 
the fact that Pillar 2 would allow for quicker responses and may be used for testing tools (which 
will be subsequently improved and possibly implemented under Pillar One).202
C. Mitigating the Procyclical Effects of Basel II
Basel III
The more refined and consolidated Basel II framework - along with “macro prudential overlay” [the 
objective of this “macro prudential overlay” comprising i) the redress of stability over time (that is, 
to  address  pro  cyclicality),  and  ii)  the  redress  of  stability  at  each  point  in  time  (system-wide 
approach], 203 is  referred  to  as  Basel  III.204 Means  through  which  “stability  over  time  (pro 
cyclicality)” could be achieved include:205
- Through counter cyclical capital charges and forward looking provisioning
- Capital conservation rules for stronger capital buffers.”
According  to  a  report,206 the  two principal  solutions  which  have  been  endorsed  by the  Turner 
Review and the DeLarosiere Report, and which are considered to have the potential to reduce pro 
198 ibid
199 See Basel Committee on Banking Supervision, „ Consultative Document: Counter cyclical Capital Buffer Proposal“ 
July 2010 http://www.bis.org/publ/bcbs172.pdf?noframes=1 at page 2.
200 Committee of European Banking Supervisors “Position Paper on a Counter Cyclical Capital Buffer” July 2009 at 
pages 1 and 2 <http://www.c-ebs.org/getdoc/715bc0f9-7af9-47d9-98a8-778a4d20a880/CEBS-position-paper-on-a-
countercyclical-capital-b.aspx>
201 ibid at page 3
202 ibid at page 4; On this basis, members of the CEBS conclude that “any counter cyclical adjustments should be 
calibrated to individual banks’ portfolios and based on risk sensitive concepts.” See ibid.
203 See H Hannoun, „Towards a Global Financial Stability Framework“ Bank for International Settlements Publications, 
page 9 of 26 <http://www.bis.org/speeches/sp100303.pdf>
204 ibid
205 ibid; Means whereby stability at each point in time (system-wide approach) could be achieved include through 
“systemic capital surcharge for systemically important financial  institutions; the identification of inter linkages and 
common exposures among all financial institutions; and the systemic oversight of OTC derivatives.” ibid.
206The Turner Review :Key Elements of the Turner Review (page 2 of 4) <http://www.dlapiper.com>
cyclical effects207 induced by the CRD and Basel II, include: 1) The requirement that banks “hold 
bigger reserves during good times - hence limiting credit and risk expansion in good times and 
storing up capital to be used during bad times” (2) “Increasing risk-weighting on a range of assets 
because this also restricts balance sheet expansion”. 
Another proposal put forward as an optimal means of rectifying Basel II's pro cyclical effects – as 
illustrated through the “amplification of business cycle fluctuations”, involves the utilisation of a 
“business cycle multiplier of the Basel II capital requirements that is increasing in the rate of growth 
of  the  GDP”.  Under  such  a  scheme,  it  is  argued,  riskier  “banks  would  face  higher  capital 
requirements without regulation exacerbating credit bubbles and crunches.”208
Other mechanisms provided under the CRD as means of mitigating pro cyclicality within the capital 
requirements framework include:209
The use of downturn Loss Given Default (LGD) estimates, PD estimates being based on long data 
series, technical adjustments made to the risk weight function, stress testing requirements and Pillar 
2 supervisory review process. It is acknowledged, however, that more measures may be required to 
mitigate the pro cyclical effects of the capital requirements framework. Options provided include 
those aimed at reducing its cyclical risk sensitivity, measures which enhance its risk capture, and the 
intentional introduction of counter-cyclical buffers (comprising capital and/or provisions). 
A counter cyclical capital charge, it is contended,210 “would require financial institutions to hold 
more capital during buoyant periods whilst lowering the regulatory capital levels during periods of 
stress.” Other capital conservation measures include “actions aimed at limiting excessive dividend 
payments, share buy backs and compensation paid out by financial institutions. Through a retention 
of earnings during buoyant periods, a bank is able to conserve excess capital which can be used to 
absorb asset write offs during less buoyant periods and periods of financial stress.”211
The  introduction  of  forward  looking  provisions  has  been  supported  by  various  sources  and 
bodies.212 As well  as illustrating how dynamic provisions can contribute towards mitigating pro 
207Exacerbated strains on bank capital is the term used to denote pro cyclicality ; see ibid 
International Accounting Standards are also considered to have had a pro-cyclical impact. It is stated that “in 
particular moving to marking to market accounting, rather than the more traditional marking to maturity, exacerbated 
volatility in the accounts of banks – with valuation becoming practically impossible for some securities as the market in 
them disappeared.”;  ibid
208R Repullo, J Saurina, and Carlos Trucharte, “How to Mitigate the Pro cyclical Effects of Capital Adequacy Rules” 
<http://www.eurointelligence.com/article.581+M5ff0e4ba595.0.html>
209See the Accompanying Document to the Proposal for a Directive of the European Parliament and of the Council 
amending  Capital  Requirements  Directive  on  trading  book,  securitisation  issues  and  remuneration  policies 
http://ec.europa.eu/internal_market/bank/docs/regcapital/com2009/impact_assesment_en.pdf
Page 46 of 47
210 See H Hannoun, „Towards a Global Financial Stability Framework“ Bank for International Settlements Publications, 
page 17; The methodology of the proposed “Too-Connected-to-Fail Capital Charge” highlighted by Jorg Chan Lau in 
his paper, comprises three important features . “First, it builds upon an intuitive principle: the capital charge must be 
proportional to the incremental contribution to societal losses (or risk) due to the failure of the institution. Second, by 
relating the  concept  of  incremental  contribution to  systemic  risk  to  concepts  such  as  Value-at-Risk  and Expected 
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implementation  by supervisory agencies  and  systemic  risk  regulators.  Third,  the  measurement  of  the  incremental 
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portfolio credit risk models.” See J Chan Lau, „Regulatory Capital Charges for Too-Connected-to-Fail Institutions: A 
Practical  Proposal”  http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1566443 and 
http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/wp/2010/wp1098.pdf at page 21
211 See H Hannoun, „Towards a Global Financial Stability Framework“ Bank for International Settlements Publications, 
page 17
212  Bodies such as ECOFIN. See particularly, M Burroni et al, “Dynamic Provisioning: Rationale, Functioning, and 
cyclical effects, a preference for such provisions (in comparison to prudential reserves), has also 
been highlighted.213 Burroni et al share the opinion that since provisions directly affect reported 
profits, they are more fully consistent with the idea of an expected loss model214 (than is the case 
with prudential reserves).215
The  benefits  of  provisions,  and  particularly  forward  looking  provisions,  will  be  considered  in 
greater detail under the concluding section of this paper.
D. Principles Governing the Operation of the Basel Committee’s Counter Cyclical Capital 
Buffer Proposal
In opting for the establishment of principles which would serve as guidance for the operation of its 
counter cyclical capital buffer proposal, the Basel Committee made provision for possible problems 
which could arise if a hard rules – based approach were to be adopted.216 Such problems, in the 
Basel Committee’s opinion, include the requirement of a very high degree of confidence (“that the 
variables used to calculate the buffer requirement would always correctly perform as intended and 
would not send out false signals”).217 Despite allowing for a certain degree of flexibility – through 
such a principles and judgemental based approach, the Committee acknowledges the importance of 
establishing a “clear set of principles” which would not only “promote sound decision making in 
the setting of the counter cyclical buffer”218 but the need to restrict the scope of judgement allowed 
(through the establishment of such clear set of principles). Furthermore, it highlights the importance 
of “proper communication” (where exercising such judgemental based decisions) as constituting an 
integral aspect of the proposal.219
Whilst the principles generally serve as guidance in the use of judgement within the framework, 
Principle One specifically provides that buffer decisions are to be guided by “the objectives to be 
achieved by the buffer – namely the protection of the banking system against potential future losses 
when excess credit growth is associated with an increase in system-wide risk.”220
Principle Five highlights the importance of alternative tools such as “loan-to-value limits, interest 
Prudential Treatment” http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1531323 and 
http://www.bancaditalia.it/pubblicazioni/econo/quest_ecofin_2/QF_57/QEF_57.pdf at page 6
213 See ibid at page 23
214 “Regulatory capital”, it is argued, “should address “unexpected losses”- such losses being defined as “losses that are 
large but infrequent” . On the other hand, “loan loss reserves should address “expected losses”. See L Laeven and G 
Majnoni, “ Loan Loss Provisioning and Economic Slowdown: Too Much Too Late?” (2003) Journal of Financial 
Intermediation Volume 12 at page 195
215 M Burroni et al, “Dynamic Provisioning: Rationale, Functioning, and Prudential Treatment” 
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1531323 and 
http://www.bancaditalia.it/pubblicazioni/econo/quest_ecofin_2/QF_57/QEF_57.pdf at page 23
216 See Basel Committee on Banking Supervision, „ Consultative Document: Counter cyclical Capital Buffer Proposal“ 
July 2010 http://www.bis.org/publ/bcbs172.pdf?noframes=1 at page 7
217 ibid
218 ibid
219 ibid
220 “The counter cyclical capital buffer is meant to provide the banking system with an additional buffer of capital 
to protect it against potential future losses, when excess credit growth in the financial system as a whole is associated 
with an increase in system-wide risk. The capital buffer can then be released when the credit cycle turns so that the 
released capital can be used to help absorb losses and reduce the risk of the supply of credit being constrained by 
regulatory capital requirements. A side benefit of operating the buffer in this fashion is that it may lean against the 
build-up of excess credit in the first place. As such, the buffer is not meant to be used as an instrument to manage 
economic cycles or asset prices. Where appropriate, those may be best addressed through fiscal, monetary and other 
public policy actions. It  is important that buffer decisions be taken after an assessment of as much of the relevant 
prevailing macroeconomic, financial and supervisory information as possible, bearing in mind that the operation of the 
buffer may have implications for the conduct of monetary and fiscal policies. “ see ibid
rate qualification tests or sectoral capital buffers which may be deployed in situations where excess 
credit growth is concentrated in specific sectors but aggregate credit growth is judged not to be 
excessive or accompanied by increased system-wide risk. “
Such principles governing the operation of the Basel Committee’s Counter Cyclical Capital Buffer 
Proposal can be contrasted with the CEBS’ view which (in line with EFC and G20 decisions), 
underlies the need for counter cyclical approaches that are based on automatic rules. The need for 
rules which would serve as a form of “automatic stabilisers” is attributed to the following factors:221
− The importance of ensuring that deterrents exist to “overcome industry or political resistance 
to increase buffers during periods of economic booms and to provide a level playing field”
− The need for transparency and “clearly announced ex-ante in order to ensure that market 
participants are aware that banks build up buffers during periods of economic booms and 
run them down during recessive periods.
− CEBS’ acknowledgment that discretion is already envisaged under Pillar Two – hence the 
need for the existence of some rules
E. Financial Stability Forum Recommendations Aimed at Mitigating Pro cyclicality 
In  its  report222 on “Addressing  Pro cyclicality in  the  Financial  System”,  the  Financial  Stability 
Forum’s recommendations to mitigate mechanisms that amplify pro cyclicality was extended to 
three areas:223
i) bank capital framework, ii) bank loan loss provisions as well as iii) leverage and valuation
issues. 
A summary of the recommendations relating to capital, as provided in the Report of the Financial 
Stability Forum is as follows:224
That the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision (BCBS) should strengthen the regulatory capital 
framework so that the quality and level of capital in the banking system increase during strong 
economic conditions and can be drawn down during periods of economic and financial stress;
That  the BCBS should revise  the market risk framework of Basel II  to  reduce the reliance on 
cyclical VAR-based capital estimates;
The BCBS should supplement the risk-based capital  requirement with a simple,  non-risk based 
measure to help contain the build-up of leverage in the banking system and put a floor under the 
Basel II framework;
Supervisors should use the Basel Committee's enhanced stress testing practices as a critical part of 
221 Committee of European Banking Supervisors, “Position Paper on a Counter Cyclical Capital Buffer” July 2009 at 
pages 3 and 4 <http://www.c-ebs.org/getdoc/715bc0f9-7af9-47d9-98a8-778a4d20a880/CEBS-position-paper-on-a-
222 “Report of the Financial Stability Forum on Addressing Pro cyclicality in the Financial System” 
http://www.financialstabilityboard.org/publications/r_0904a.pdf
223Accompanying Document to the Proposal for a Directive of the European Parliament and of the Council amending 
Capital  Requirements  Directive  on  trading  book,  securitisation  issues  and  remuneration  policies 
http://ec.europa.eu/internal_market/bank/docs/regcapital/com2009/impact_assesment_en.pdf page 46 of 47
224 See “Report of the Financial Stability Forum on Addressing Pro cyclicality in the Financial System” at pages 2 and 3 
http://www.financialstabilityboard.org/publications/r_0904a.pdf
the Pillar 2 supervisory review process to validate the adequacy of banks’ capital buffers above the 
minimum regulatory capital requirement;
That  the  BCBS  should  monitor  the  impact  of  the  Basel  II  framework  and  make  appropriate 
adjustments to dampen excessive cyclicality of the minimum capital requirements;
That  the BCBS carry out regular  assessments of the risk coverage of the capital  framework in 
relation to financial developments and banks’ evolving risk profiles and make timely enhancements.
6) Conclusion
In  its  attempt  to  adopt  “a  building  block  approach”  which  would  organise  the  work  on  pro 
cyclicality – the aim of this approach being “the alignment of development of tools to address pro 
cyclicality according to a specific set of objectives”, four identified objectives set out by the Basel 
Committee  in  its  December  2009 Consultative  Document  “Strengthening  the  Resilience  of  the 
Banking Sector”, are as follows:225
- To dampen any excess cyclicality of the minimum capital requirement; 
- To promote more forward looking provisions; 
- To conserve capital to build buffers at individual banks and the banking sector that can be 
used during periods of stress; and 
- To achieve the broader macro prudential goal of protecting the banking sector from periods 
of excess credit growth.”
In  accordance  with  the  CEBS’ observations,  counter  cyclical  mechanisms  should  be  i)  bank 
specific,  (ii)  based  on  risk  sensitive  concepts  -  should  also  be  compatible  with  the  incentive 
structure presented by Basel II (as well as Basel III), and (iii) should not be excessively burdensome 
in terms of data needs and computational efforts.226
Whilst efforts taken by the Committee appear to have focussed on capital – as evidenced by its 
Consultative  Document  on  Counter  Cyclical  Capital  Buffer  Proposal,  more  forward  looking 
provisions – as well as provisions which at are aimed at addressing losses and unforeseen problems 
attributed to “maturity transformation of short-term deposits into long term loans”, would be greatly 
welcomed.
Hannoun highlights the advantages which a forward looking provisioning model offers over that of 
an  “incurred  loss”  provisioning  model.  In  his  opinion,  a  forward  looking  provisioning  model 
encourages banks to set aside provisions in a forward looking fashion based on expected losses – as 
opposed to the more backward looking provisions based on incurred losses.227 Furthermore, he adds 
that “ a forward looking approach not only captures actual losses more transparently, but is also less 
pro cyclical than the incurred loss provisioning model which is presently being used.”228
Further,  the Committee of European Banking Supervisors (CEBS) has acknowledged that tools 
225 See Basel Committee on Banking Supervision, „ Consultative Document: Counter cyclical Capital Buffer Proposal“ 
July 2010 http://www.bis.org/publ/bcbs172.pdf?noframes=1 at page 1
226 Bank specificity would ensure that counter cyclical tools are “tailored to the peculiarities of each bank’s 
portfolios”, risk sensitive based concepts would mitigate “perverse incentives – as well as opportunities for arbitrage”. 
See Committee of European Banking Supervisors, “Position Paper on a Counter Cyclical Capital Buffer” July 2009 at 
page 4
227 See H Hannoun, „Towards a Global Financial Stability Framework“ Bank for International Settlements Publications, 
page 17
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which could be implemented as measures for mitigating cyclicality, exist beyond those measures 
proposed by the Basel Committee. As a result, it has taken up initiatives in relation to measures 
such as dynamic provisioning and supplementary measures which include leverage ratios.229
The proposed two new liquidity requirements, namely, the Liquidity Coverage Ratio and the Net 
Stable  Funding  Ratio  (NSFR),  respectively  serve  the  purposes  of  “ensuring  that  banks  have 
adequate funding liquidity to survive one month of difficult funding conditions (the LCR), and to 
address  the  mismatches  between the  maturity  of  a  bank’s  assets  and  that  of  its  liabilities  (the 
NSFR).”230 Whilst such liquidity requirements would help to address the critical issues arising as a 
result of maturity mismatches, the implementation of counter cyclical capital buffers – as well as 
these new liquidity requirements (LCR and NSFR) would be bolstered by introducing more forward 
looking provisions.
229 Committee of European Banking Supervisors, “Position Paper on a Counter Cyclical Capital Buffer” July 2009 at 
page 2 http://www.c-ebs.org/getdoc/715bc0f9-7af9-47d9-98a8-778a4d20a880/CEBS-position-paper-on-a-
countercyclical-capital-b.aspx
230 See Basel Committee on Banking Supervision, “An Assessment of the Long Term Economic Impact of Stronger 
Capital  and  Liquidity  Requirements”  Bank  for  International  Settlements  Publications  August  2010  at  page  7 
<http://www.bis.org/publ/bcbs173.pdf?noframes=1>
Measures Aimed at Enhancing the Loss Absorbency of Regulatory Capital at the 
Point of Non Viability231
Introduction
Capital is very significant in its role since it serves to absorb risks and protect deposits. Given the 
imposition  of  an  adequately  stipulated  minimum  ratio,  it  could  also  facilitate  the  process  of 
equalising competition between banks (rather than impeding their ability to compete).
The  Basel  Committee’s  recent  consultative  document  on  the  “Proposal  to  Ensure  the  Loss 
Absorbency of  Regulatory Capital  at  the Point  of  Non Viability”  sets  out  a  proposal  aimed at 
“enhancing the entry criteria of regulatory capital to ensure that all regulatory capital instruments 
issued by banks are capable of absorbing losses in the event that a bank is unable to support itself in 
the private market.”232
Of particular  interest  are  the Committee’s  observations  regarding the  consequences  of  rescuing 
several distressed banks during the recent Financial Crisis, through the injection of funds (by the 
public sector) in the form of common equity and other forms of Tier One Capital. Two associated 
consequences are as follows:233
Its effect of supporting not only depositors but also the investors in regulatory capital instruments – 
which consequently resulted in the inability of Tier Two capital instruments (mainly subordinated 
debt), and in some cases, non-common Tier One instruments, to absorb losses incurred by certain 
large  internationally  active  banks  that  would  have  failed  -  had  the  public  sector  not  provided 
support.
As a means of ensuring that instruments are accorded with the status of  “regulatory capital” and 
also dealt with accordingly, a pre condition was stipulated by the Committee – such pre condition 
being that “such instruments are capable of bearing a loss.”234
As well as the affirmation of its opinion that “a public sector injection of capital (needed to avoid 
the failure of a bank) should not protect investors in regulatory capital instruments from absorbing 
the loss that they would have incurred if the public sector had not chosen to rescue the bank”, the 
Basel  Committee  clearly  indicated  in  the  Consultative  Document  that  all  regulatory  capital 
231 See Basel Committee for Banking Supervision, Bank for International Settlements Publications 
http://www.biz.org/publ/bcbs174/marianneojo.pdf
232 See Basel Committee on Banking Supervision, Consultative Document “Proposal to Ensure the Loss Absorbency of 
Regulatory Capital at the Point of Non Viability” August 2010 at page 1 (page 7 of 20) < 
www.bis.org/publ/bcbs174.htm.>
233 See ibid
234 Of particular interest is the third option which was provided by the Committee as a means of ensuring this outcome 
(of ensuring that  such instruments are capable of  bearing a loss).  This option is  namely,  the requirement that  “all 
regulatory capital instruments include a mechanism in their terms and conditions that would ensure that they would 
accept a loss at the point of non viability.” See ibid.
instruments  must  be  capable  of  absorbing  a  loss  at  least  in  gone  concern  situations.235 This 
requirement was prompted by the Basel Committee’s observations from the recent Financial Crisis 
– which revealed that many regulatory capital  instruments do not always absorb losses in gone 
concern situations. In this respect it remarked that:236
“The numerous public sector injections of capital during the crisis, and other forms of public sector 
support have had the indirect consequence of ensuring that in many instances, capital instruments 
issued by banks that have been bailed out, have not taken any losses at all.”
Owing to huge liquidity problems, it was just recently announced that the ailing mortgage lender 
(Hypo Real Estate) is to be granted  € 40 billion to the already  € 102 billion in state guarantees. 
This (most recent) grant will also facilitate the launch of a “bad bank” whereby its toxic assets can 
be disposed of (aim being to strengthen the remaining core bank).237
The case of Hypo Real Estate (HRE)238 is considered within this respect, not because it is regarded 
as having not absorbed any losses (at all), but rather, because it is questionable whether the resulting 
burden imposed on taxpayers (arising from government funding), could have been mitigated to a 
greater extent. Even though rescue aid was granted by the Commission to Hypo Real Estate on the 
2nd of October 2008 and further measures were also communicated by the German authorities on the 
26th October  2009 (measures which included SOFFin guarantees  of  8  and 10 billion Euros for 
HRE),239 HRE was eventually nationalised.240
235 The  Basel  Committee  added  that  “if  gone  concern  were  to  be  defined  as  insolvency and  liquidation,  then  all 
regulatory capital instruments would be loss absorbent on a gone concern basis and such loss absorbency would be 
achieved through the subordination of the capital instruments – with the result that any repayment in liquidation would 
only be received if all depositors and higher ranked creditors are first repaid in full.” It however defined „gone concern“ 
to include „situations in which the public sector provides support to distressed banks that would otherwise have failed. 
ibid at page 3
236 ibid at page 3
237See Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung, “40 Milliarden Euro mehr Staatsgarantien”(Hypo Real Estate: 40 billion Euros 
Worth of More Government Guarantees) 11th September 2010 
<http://www.faz.net/s/RubD16E1F55D21144C4AE3F9DDF52B6E1D9/Doc~EB16F2C756D694B4CA07FA5F7EF8E7
535~ATpl~Ecommon~Scontent.html> See also Bild, “Staats-Garantien für Hypo Real Estate: Wieso kriegt die Pleite-
Bank noch einmal Milliarden?” 11th September 2010 <http://www.bild.de/BILD/politik/wirtschaft/2010/09/11/hypo-
real-estate-wieso-kriegt/die-pleite-bank-ploetzlich-noch-einmal-milliarden.html>
238 See  European  Commission,  “State  Aid  no  NN  44/2008  –  Germany  Rescue  aid  for  Hypo  Real  Estate” 
http://ec.europa.eu/competition/state_aid/register/ii/doc/NN-44-2008-WLWL-en-02.10.2008.pdf
239 See European Commission “European Commission State aid no N 694/2009 – Germany Emergency Guarantees for 
Hypo Real Estate” paragraph 3
240 “In January 2009, the German government had promulgated necessary measures aimed at facilitating the adoption of 
legislation  which  would  enable  it  acquire  a  majority  stake  holding  in 
Hypo.”<http://www.reuters.com/article/idUSTRE5381WB20090409> “The squeeze out of minority shareholders – this 
being approved by a court  in Munich in October  2009, paved the way for  the German government’s  rescue fund 
SOFFin to get 100% of the real estate lender.” See Reuters; “Hypo Real Estate is Nationalised with Squeeze Out” 
<http://www.reuters.com/article/idUSLD67573320091013>
B. How Can the Desire to Facilitate Gone Concern Loss Absorbency of All Regulatory 
Capital Instruments (Including cases where there is public sector support) be Achieved?
“Conversion/Write offs” 
Whereby debt  instruments  are  transferred into “higher  quality and common equity capital  with 
better  loss  absorption  characteristics  –  with  the  result  that  the  institution’s  ability to  withstand 
further losses is consolidated.”241
Debt  regarded as  bank capital  should  be converted  to  stock  or  written  off  in  a  crisis  –  hence 
compelling bond investors to  bear  some of the cost  of future bail  outs.242All  regulatory capital 
instruments sold by banks should be capable of absorbing losses if the company is unable to fund 
itself  –  before  taxpayers’ cash  is  plundered  into  rescuing  a  lender,  so-called  contingent  capital 
should be converted into equity or written off.243
Controlled Winding Down Procedures
In the case which involved Bradford and Bingley, the UK authorities decided to pursue a wind 
down  procedure whereby the retail deposit book was to be sold while an orderly wind down of the 
remainder of the business was to be undertaken for the purposes of maximising recoveries – as well 
as minimising the burden on tax payers.244
Reasons  for  undertaking  the  route  of  a  controlled  winding  down  process  –  as  opposed  to 
uncontrolled insolvency were also highlighted. An orderly winding down process would not only 
“maximise the value of the remaining assets and minimise the amount of necessary state aid”, but 
would  also  facilitate  the  repayment  of  the  working  capital  facility  as  well  as  statutory  debt. 
Furthermore,  the  reasons  for  the  choice  of  a  controlled  winding  down  process  necessitated  a 
consideration of the legislation in force when the decision to wind down Bradford and Bingley (and 
thereafter, Rumpco) was taken – and such reasons include:245
An absence of a “strictly defined time-frame” for large and complex liquidations such as that of 
Bradford and Bingley (B & B).The fact that B & B would not have obtained the working capital 
facility which was required in order to pay Rumpco creditors – had B & B chosen the route of 
241 See Basel Committee on Banking Supervision, Consultative Document “Proposal to Ensure the Loss Absorbency of 
Regulatory  Capital  at  the  Point  of  Non  Viability”  August  2010  at  page  13  (page  19  of  20)  < 
http://www.bis.org/publ/bcbs174.pdf?noframes=1>
242 “Basel Committee Says Bank Bond Investors Should Help Fund Future Bailouts” 
<http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2010-08-19/basel-committee-says-bank-bond-investors-should-help-bear-cost-of-
bailouts.html>
243 ibid
244 See European Commission, “State Aid N194/2009 – United Kingdom : Liquidation Aid to Bradford and Bingley 
Plc” at paragraph 4 page 2
245ibid at paragraphs 13 and 14
uncontrolled  insolvency.  An  uncontrolled  insolvency  procedure  would  also  have  resulted  in  a 
liquidation shortfall with respect to debt owed to creditors.An uncontrolled insolvency procedure 
would have endangered the prospects of the recovery of full value of statutory debt. Rumpco’s 
uncontrolled insolvency would have undermined financial stability – as well as market confidence.
C. Definition of Different Classes of Capital – should there be a re-definition of what 
constitutes regulatory capital – since it has been proposed that all regulatory instruments 
should be convertible/capable of absorbing losses?
Capital is considered to comprise of elements of Tier One, Two and Three capital. Tier One Capital 
comprises common equity – which has the following attributes: 246
- It is considered to be the highest quality component of capital
- It is subordinated to all other elements of funding – absorbing losses as and when they 
occur, having full flexibility of dividend payments
- No maturity date
- It is the primary form of funding which helps to ensure that banks remain solvent.
The  distinction  between  definitions  of  Tier  One  and  Tier  Two  capital  are  highlighted  by  the 
Committee as corresponding to capital which absorbs losses on a going concern basis and capital 
which absorbs losses on a gone concern basis respectively.247
Proposed key changes, whilst aimed at “significantly improving the quality and consistency of the 
common equity of Tier One capital”, as well as simplifying Tier Two Capital (to the extent that 
there would be only one set of entry criteria – and the removal of sub categories pertaining to Tier 
Two) also include the recommendation that Tier Three capital be abolished “to ensure that market 
risks are met with the same quality of capital as credit and operational risks.”248
As a result, the proposed harmonised structure of capital will consist of Tier One Capital (going 
concern capital) with further components comprising common equity and additional going concern 
capital and; Tier Two Capital (gone concern capital).249
In  proposing  a  new definition  of  capital,  the  Basel  Committee  on  Banking Supervision,  in  its 
Consultative Document,250 elaborated on “certain overarching objectives” which had contributed 
towards its formulation of the proposed new definition of capital and these are as follows:
a) Tier One Capital must help a bank to remain a going concern
b) Regulatory adjustments must be applied to the appropriate component of capital
246 Basel Committee on Banking Supervision, Consultative Document “Strengthening the Resilience of the Banking 
Sector” December 2009 at page 14
247 ibid
248 ibid at page 14-16
249 ibid at page 17
250 Basel Committee on Banking Supervision, Consultative Document “Strengthening the Resilience of the Banking 
Sector” December 2009 at pages 14 and 15 <http://www.bis.org/publ/bcbs164.pdf>
c) Regulatory capital must be simple and harmonised across jurisdictions
d) The components of regulatory capital must be clearly disclosed
The proposed new definition of capital offers several advantages – one of which is namely, the 
facilitation of harmonisation – since the regulatory definition of capital  varies according to  the 
jurisdiction and its governing law.251
D. Problems and Benefits Identified with Basel Committee’s Loss Absorbency Proposal
Some problems identified with the Basel Committee’s proposal - that all regulatory instruments 
should be capable of absorbing losses include the following:
- the need for a liquid market (which is considered not to exist at present)
- A  possible  rise  in  the  banks’  cost  of  capital  (since  investors  are  likely  to  demand 
compensation for  the increased risk being borne – for which they will  not  be repaid.252 
Lower levels of investment
-  Increased uncertainty and further elevated levels of instability as a result of lower levels of 
investment
Even though the above-mentioned issues have been raised, the Basel Committee is clearly justified 
in its affirmation that “a public sector injection of capital (needed to avoid the failure of a bank) 
should not  protect  investors in regulatory capital  instruments from absorbing the loss that  they 
would have incurred if the public sector had not chosen to rescue the bank.”
Furthermore, most of these concerns are not entirely well-grounded since investment (in any case – 
and regardless of the recommendation that all regulatory capital instruments issued by banks are 
capable of absorbing losses on a going and gone concern basis) will always involve an element of 
risk. Banks should not be made to pay more money to investors for regulatory capital (if and when 
investors demand compensation for increased risk for which they will not be repaid) since investors 
get paid to take risks and should expect risks with investments. Perhaps some form of reward or 
loyalty payments could be tied in to the investments – such rewards being redeemed253 by investors 
only in the event that the bank or firm operates on a gone concern basis. Other schemes which serve 
to ensure that minimum safeguards are place to compensate investors, to insure investor protection - 
as well  as encourage small  investors to  invest  in  securities,  include the Investor  Compensation 
Schemes Directive (the ICD) 254 and Deposit Guarantee Schemes Directive.255 The ICD (which has 
251 The regulatory definition of capital is considered to be “inevitably embedded in company law”. See European 
Banking Federation, Comments on Consultative Documents issued by Basel Committee on Banking Supervision 
“Strengthening the Resilience of the Banking Sector” and “International Framework for Liquidity Risk Measurement, 
Standards and Monitoring” at page 13
252 “Basel Committee Says Bank Bond Investors Should Help Fund Future Bailouts” 
<http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2010-08-19/basel-committee-says-bank-bond-investors-should-help-bear-cost-of-
bailouts.html>
253 The European Banking Federation (EBF) made a proposal that instruments should not qualify (or be included) as 
Tier  2  capital  if  there  would  be  incentives  to  redeem.  European  Banking  Federation,  Comments  on  consultative 
documents issued by Basel Committee on Banking Supervision “Strengthening the Resilience of the Banking  Sector” 
and “International Framework for Liquidity Risk Measurement, Standards and Monitoring” at page 13
254 The  Directive  97/9/EC  on  Investor  Compensation  Schemes,  known  as  the  Investment  Compensation  Scheme 
Directive (the ICD), was adopted in 1997 as a supplement for the Investment Services Directive (Council Directive 
93/22/EEC of 10 May 1993 on investment services in the securities field (OJ L 141,11.6.1993, p. 27–46).
255 Directive 94/19/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 30 May 1994 on deposit-guarantee schemes 
[amended by Directive 2005/1/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 9 March 2005 and Directive 
2009/14/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 11 March 2009 amending Directive 94/19/EC on deposit-
been replaced by the Markets in Financial Instruments Directive – MiFID), “provides for clients 
receiving  investment  services  from  investment  firms  (including  credit  institutions)  to  be 
compensated  in  specific  circumstances  where  the  firm is  unable  to  return  money  or  financial 
instruments that it holds on the client’s behalf.”256
It is acknowledged that the Committee’s recommendations should signal to investors that higher 
risks are to be anticipated. Furthermore, bond holders (and not tax payers) should now expect to be 
the first resort (in terms of funding and new equity) where it is evident that an institution is likely to 
operate on a gone concern basis. This could result in slightly lower levels of investment – however, 
it could also produce the beneficial result of discouraging investment by those investors who take 
excessive risks – hence reducing moral hazard. A balance should be struck between introducing 
appropriate incentives (aimed at sustaining healthy levels of investment) which would encourage 
non reckless investors to invest and the need to discourage excessive levels of risk taking.
Based on the Basel Committee’s efforts to improve the disclosure requirements of the components 
of regulatory capital, greater transparency should be facilitated – such transparency contributing to 
less uncertainty and assisting investors in deciding whether or not to invest in certain products. 
Bank depositors have greater need of protection since more rules (range of conduct rules)257 exist 
within the investment sector - which serve the purpose of assisting investors in arriving at their 
investment decisions. In so far as the Basel Committee is able to achieve efforts aimed at mitigating 
substantial elements of uncertainty which may exist – with respect to the implementation of new 
regulations,  such  efforts  should  eliminate  the  fears  attributed  to  consequences  of  uncertainty – 
namely, greater volatility in the bank bond market.
Benefits of the Basel Committee’s Proposals
Discouraging excessive risk taking (since investors will not be encouraged to buy securities under 
the assumption that they will avoid losses in the event of a bank failure)
It would reduce the need for government bailouts owing to the requirement that contingent capital 
be converted (to equity or written off) to fund rescues rather than taxpayers solely bearing the cost. 
Hence bond investors of a bank will serve as the first resort during the impending collapse of a 
bank.
guarantee schemes as regards the coverage level and the payout delay (Text with EEA relevance)]
http://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=CELEX:31994L0019:EN:HTML
256 See Proposal for a DIRECTIVE OF THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT AND OF THE COUNCIL
amending Directive 97/9/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council on investor compensation
schemes at page 2 <http://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=COM:2010:0371:FIN:EN:PDF>
257 As well as serving as an “additional layer of protection in collaboration with conduct of business rules, prudential 
regulation and operational safeguards, the Investor Compensation Schemes Directive (ICD) is also aimed at “protecting 
investors against the risk of losses in the event of an investment firm’s inability to repay money or return assets held on 
their  behalf.”  See  DG Internal  Market  and  Services,  EVALUATION OF THE INVESTMENT COMPENSATION 
SCHEME  DIRECTIVE  DG  INTERNAL  MARKET  AND  SERVICES  EXECUTIVE  REPORT  AND 
RECOMMENDATIONS at page 2
http://ec.europa.eu/dgs/internal_market/docs/evaluation/inv-comp-schem-directive_en.pdf
E. Measures Identified by the AFME as Means of Rescuing Failing Banks Without 
Taxpayer Financing.
In its paper “The Systemic Safety Net: Pulling Failing Firms Back From the Edge”, the Association 
for Financial Markets in Europe (AFME) shed some light on two mechanisms which are considered 
to be instrumental in the achievement of the goal of managing a failing financial institution – as 
well  as  the  re  capitalisation  of  such  an  institution  (without  the  need  for  capital  support  from 
governments and tax payers).258 These mechanisms are:259
1) The Bail In Mechanism : Whose implementation commences when a firm reaches a pre-defined 
trigger  –  which  would  re-capitalise  a  firm as  a  going  concern  (through the  conversion  of 
selected  levels  of  unsecured  debt  to  common  equity).  Since  no  shareholder  or  creditor 
consultation is considered to be necessary, a swift implementation of its operation is expected.
2) Contingent Capital: Whose implementation has been undertaken historically by the insurance 
sector and which serves as a provision for one-time losses. It is issued in the form of notes 
which are convertible into equity as soon as a pre-defined trigger is attained by the issuer. Since 
it requires no regulatory involvement, transparency is enhanced – such transparency serving as 
a potential means in helping to prevent localised problems from triggering into a full blown 
systemic crisis.”
One difference between both mechanisms can be attributed to the frequency of their applicability. 
Whilst contingent capital serves as a provision for one-time losses which are unexpected, the bail in 
mechanism operates according to an expected pre-determined threshold level.
According  to  the  AFME,  either  of  these  options  would  serve  as  a  better  alternative  than 
liquidation.260
258 Association for Financial Markets in Europe, “AFME Outlines Ways To Rescue Failing Banks Without Tax Payer 
Financing” http://www.afme.eu/AFME/Home/sifi%20pr.pdf at page 1 of 2
259 ibid
260 Furthermore, the AFME adds that with each option, the bank’s shareholders would bear the loss through devaluation 
or dilution of their equity and that (more critically), neither option requires capital support from tax payers or a pre 
capitalised fund for providing liquidity. See ibid.
F. Basel Committee’s Measures Aimed At Improving the Quality of Tier One Capital
Source: “Improving the Quality of Tier One Capital”261
„The enhanced Basel II framework (which includes reforms aimed at increasing the quantity of 
capital – as well as improving the quality of capital),and the macroprudential overlay are (together) 
referred to as Basel III. „262
261 See H Hannoun, „Towards a Global Financial Stability Framework“ Bank for International Settlements Publications, 
page  11  of  26  <http://www.bis.org/speeches/sp100303.pdf>see  also  page  9  of  26;ibid.  „With  hindsight,  it  is 
acknowledged that the global banking system entered the crisis with an insufficient level of capital and not enough 
high-quality capital. Recall that regulated financial institutions are required to hold Tier 1 and Tier 2 capital equal to 8% 
of risk-weighted assets, with Tier 1 capital representing at least half this amount. Unfortunately the definition of what 
constituted capital included instruments or accounting items that could not absorb losses on a going-concern basis. 
Market  participants knew this, and increasingly focused on the levels of tangible common equity in banks’ capital 
structures (after deduction of intangible assets such as goodwill). The levels of core Tier 1 equity proved to be too low.“ 
See page 10 of 26;ibid.
262Ibid at page 9 of 26
Conclusion
According  to  Laeven  and  Majnoni,263 regulatory  capital,  “should  cope  with  the  occurrence  of 
unexpected  losses  –  that  is,  losses  that  are  large  but  infrequent  and  further,  loan  loss  reserves 
should,  instead ,cope with expected losses.” In reconciling the different views held about bank 
capital requirements, they propose a partitioning of regulatory capital which is based not only on 
terms relating to priority (as is the case for Tier One and Tier Two Capital), but also (and foremost) 
on risk management considerations.264 The management of “Too Big to Fail Firms” should be sent 
appropriate signals – signals which would highlight the fact that the importance of such firms (to 
systemic stability) does not provide justification for the management of such firms to act recklessly. 
Intensive restructuring, to the extent that the entire management of such a firm is replaced (with 
new management) serves as an example of such a warning. This would also facilitate the reduction 
of moral hazard and excessive levels of risk taking. 
Distinguishing  between  Expected  and  Unexpected  Losses:  Regulatory  Capital  and  Unexpected 
Losses v Loan Loss Reserves and Expected Losses
Should  Tier  One  Capital  alone  cover  potential  losses  –  particularly  in  view  of  the  Basel 
Committee’s  recent  recommendation which is  aimed at  ensuring that  all  regulatory instruments 
absorb losses? Which component should (have)  or be endowed with greater  capacity to  absorb 
expected or unexpected losses?265 
With respect to the current debate on loss loan provisioning,  the European Banking Federation 
(EBF), the EBF is supportive of the provisioning based on Expected Loss model and recommended 
a provisioning model based on the EL concept, which “captures the economic reality of the lending 
activities  of  financial  institutions  in  line  with  the  six  principles  of  the  Bank  for  International 
Settlements” in order to achieve sound Expected Loss provisioning approach.266
Two principal reasons have been put forward by the European Banking Federation to justify their 
proposal of a sufficient level of non-predominant Tier One when limits to the capital components 
are determined.267 These are attributed to “the quality of non-core instruments which will increase 
263 See L Laeven and G Majnoni, „Loan Loss Provisioning and Economic Slowdowns: Too Much, Too Late? at page 6
264 ibid
265 The preference for total regulatory capital – owing to its effectiveness in capturing potential losses, was highlighted 
by the Federcasse – in reference to the proposal of a consideration of only Tier One capital to cover buffers.  See 
Federazione  Italiana  delle  Banche  di  Credito  Cooperativo  Casse  Rurali  ed  Artigiane,(Federcasse)  Comments  on 
consultative  documents  issued  by Basel  Committee  on  Banking  Supervision  “Strengthening  the  Resilience  of  the 
Banking  Sector” and “International Framework for Liquidity Risk Measurement, Standards and Monitoring” 
              http://www.bis.org/publ/bcbs165/ifoccb.pdf   at page 10
266 European Banking Federation, Comments on consultative documents issued by Basel Committee on Banking 
Supervision “Strengthening the Resilience of the Banking  Sector” and “International Framework for Liquidity Risk 
Measurement, Standards and Monitoring” at page 6 
http://www.finansraadet.dk/media/208544/ebf_hoeringssvar_international_framework_for_liquidity_risk_measurement
_standards_and_monitoring_150410.pdf
267 European Banking Federation, Comments on consultative documents issued by Basel Committee on Banking 
Supervision “Strengthening the Resilience of the Banking  Sector” and “International Framework for Liquidity Risk 
Measurement, Standards and Monitoring” at page 13 
http://www.finansraadet.dk/media/208544/ebf_hoeringssvar_international_framework_for_liquidity_risk_measurement
_standards_and_monitoring_150410.pdf
significantly compared to today’s instruments; and the fact that institutions will need to increase 
their global own funds level to comply with the new rules. “268
Should the minimum capital ratio of 8% be revised?
For reasons associated with the desire to enhance the competitive ability of banks, an increase in the 
present capital ratio is not favoured.
Tier Two capital should be able to cover losses absorbed at the point of non viability – however, 
restrictions should be imposed on such potential – in contrast to the case with Tier One capital. 
There should be less restrictions on the classes of debt like instruments which can be included under 
Tier One capital.
Furthermore,  those  shares  which  are  to  be  redeemed  (as  incentives)  in  the  event  of  the  firm 
operating as a gone concern (and which should also absorb losses – hence resulting in a reduction of 
their values when and if they are redeemed) should be included as Tier One capital. As illustrated, 
Basel  III  reforms  reflect  efforts  being  made  within  this  field  –  particularly  with  respect  to 
contingent convertible bonds (which are currently being reviewed).
268 Other benefits attributed to the non-core Tier 1 instruments include its large investor base and the very useful 
currency diversification. For this reason, a request was put (by the European Banking Federation) to the Committee to 
set Core Tier 1 at a reasonable level - close to 51%.;ibid
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